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ABSTRACT 
 
We evaluate the extent to which sell-side equity analysts can facilitate market efficiency when 
there is increasing uncertainty about a stock‘s future value. The prevalence of the 52-week-
high momentum anomaly, that can be largely attributed to information uncertainty, provides a 
setting for examining the value and timing of analysts‘ earnings forecast revisions. Our study 
finds that analysts can provide value-relevant signals to investors by picking up indicators of 
momentum. The ability to identify under or over-valued stocks suggests that analysts are 
important information intermediaries in the price-continuation momentum effect. However, 
we also observe pervasive asymmetric reaction to good and bad news throughout our study 
that is consistent with incentive-driven reporting and optimistic biases. Nevertheless, analysts‘ 
forecast revisions are informative at different stages to re-establish stock prices back to their 
fundamental valuation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Momentum trading profits pose arguably one of the greatest challenges to the semi-
strong-form efficient market hypothesis (Fama and French 2008). Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) demonstrate that individual stock returns exhibit predictable momentum behaviour at 
intermediate horizons. The simple price-momentum strategy of maintaining a self-funded 
investment portfolio via simultaneously buying past winners and short-selling past losers, 
enables momentum traders to earn abnormal profits for the next 12 months (JT strategy).  
George and Hwang (2004) investigate the return predictability of the 52-week-high 
and low price in the US stock market. The 52-week-high momentum strategy is formed based 
on the current price of stock in relation its‘ 52-week-high price (GH strategy). When stocks 
are trade near or far from 52-week-high prices, investors form a psychological ―anchor‖ on 
the elevated price and subsequently underreact to new information about these stocks. 
However, as information relating to the true value of stocks continues to persist in the longer 
term, the correction (adjustment) of investors‘ prior underreaction behaviour leads to a 
subsequent price continuation effect. Bhootra and Hur (2013) include a recency measure as an 
enhancement to the 52-week-high price strategy of George and Hwang (2004). They suggest 
that the addition of recency bias accentuates anchoring bias. Thus, the ‗recency‘ strategy of 
Bhootra and Hur (2013) (BH strategy) that conditions recency measure upon the stock‘s 52-
week-high, significantly increases profits to the momentum strategy due to a higher degree of 
underreaction
1
.  
Hao, et al. (2015) find evidence of profitability of the recency strategy in Taiwan.  
This is an unusual finding as unlike the US, the 52-week-high (and low) prices of individual 
stocks are not readily reported in the Taiwanese market, therefore the psychological anchor of 
the 52-week-high price is unavailable. Thus, the evidence of the dissociation of anchoring 
bias in Hao et al. (2015) leads towards the investigation of other factors that may 
contemporaneously underpin the profits of the recency strategy. Analysts‘ forecasts impact 
stock prices and trading strategies as their recommendations are used by investors to identify 
under or over-valued stocks. Our paper investigates whether analysts‘ earnings forecasts 
provide additional explanatory power for future stock returns and profits in the momentum 
strategy.  
                                                        
1
 Bhootra and Hur's (2013) recency of the 52-week-high price strategy applies the notion of proximity, i.e., 
number of days since a stock has attained its 52-week-high price. 
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 Prior studies find that analysts can facilitate market efficiency acting as information 
intermediaries by collecting and processing information about firms, and their 
recommendations are important to reconnect stock prices back to their fundamental values 
(e.g., Barber et al. 2001; Hong and Wu 2016 ; Wieland 2011; Jung, Sun, and Yang 2012). 
Womack (1996) suggests that analysts express their opinions of the current price of stocks 
with earnings forecasts, and this feedback steers investors‘ investment decisions. Further, 
Laksanabunsong (2015) suggests that analysts‘ recent performance affects their credibility, 
and the magnitude of post-forecast revision drift is greater for stocks associated with positive 
analysts‘ performance. 
 However, several competing studies contend that analysts‘ forecasts are inefficient as 
they do not fully incorporate past information into their recommendations. In their forecasts 
of firm performance, analysts place a greater weight on heuristic valuations than present 
valuation models known to predict profitability (i.e., residual income models) (Bradshaw , 
2004).  Jegadeesh et al. (2004) purport that analysts do not take advantage of the various stock 
characteristics known to predict stock returns and that the implications of their forecasts are in 
line with economic incentives faced by sell-side brokerage firms. These economic incentives 
induce analysts to be overly optimistic in their forecasts (Ivković and Jegadeesh 2004; Chen 
et al. 2015). 
 Our study investigates the interaction between analysts‘ forecast revisions and profits 
from the recency momentum strategy by using various portfolio-level sorting and regression 
analyses.  We find that the magnitude of analysts‘ forecast revisions has incremental 
explanatory power for future stock returns, whereby analysts can facilitate market efficiency 
by providing earnings forecast revisions that are closely related to price-momentum 
indicators. Our results show evidence of pervasive asymmetric reaction to good and bad news 
that is consistent with incentive-driven reporting by analysts. This implies that the direction of 
analysts‘ forecast revisions (upwards/downwards) have a significant role at different stages to 
reconnect stock prices back to their fundamental value. The ability to pick under or 
overvalued stocks suggests that analysts are an important source of information in the price 
continuation momentum effect. In addition, our multivariate regressions on stocks in the 
recency momentum strategy find support for the incremental effects of positive 
performance for upward revisions.   
Our contributions to the literature are two-fold. First, our work is the only study to 
document the interaction between analysts‘ forecasts and the 52-week-high momentum 
trading. We extend the work of Jegadeesh et al.'s (2004) to evaluate analysts‘ ability to extract 
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value-relevant information from (the 52-week-high) momentum indicators that are closely 
associated with behavioural factors or information uncertainty. We also incorporate the 
measure of positive analysts‘ performance that is relatively new in the literature 
(Laksanabunsong 2015), and examine whether analysts‘ recent performance has an 
incremental effect on post-forecast revision drift. Second, we evaluate the extent to which 
sell-side analysts can facilitate market efficiency by picking up indicators of momentum, and 
translate them into value-relevant information that is incrementally able to predict future stock 
returns. Burghof and Prothmann (2011) find greater information uncertainty
2
 in stocks near 
and far from the 52-week-high price, thus our results are economically meaningful as they 
suggest how analysts derive their forecasts when there is ambiguity about stock prospects, and 
provide valuable signals to investors of the stock‘s future value. Despite these estimates 
stemming from heuristic valuations (Bradshaw 2004), this does not compromise the 
usefulness of analysts and their ability to provide value-relevant information for investors 
(Penman 2010). Furthermore, our research finds evidence in support of the literature 
documenting evidence of optimistic biases in analysts‘ forecast revisions that are consistent 
with the economic incentives faced by sell-side analysts. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explores the relevant 
literature and formally presents the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data sources, research 
design and descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical results and summarizes our 
findings in relation to our hypotheses. We conclude in Section 5. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Momentum and Information Uncertainty 
George and Hwang (2004) propose a 52-week-high strategy that simultaneously buys 
stocks near their 52-week-high price and short-sells stocks far from their 52-week-high price. 
Rather than using past price changes (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), they argue that price-
levels are more important determinants of momentum returns. Despite the irrelevance of the 
52-week-high to the future operating performance of the firm, the 52-week-high strategy 
(George and Hwang, 2004) exhibits superior returns to the price-momentum strategy 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) and has the ability to persist through time without return 
reversals. In an out-of-sample test, Liu, Liu, and Ma (2011) find that the 52-week-high 
                                                        
2Information uncertainty refers to the state of scepticism about the impact of new information on a firm‘s 
fundamental value. This can surface either due to lack of knowledge, quality of information, or implied riskiness 
of the firm‘s fundamentals (Zhang, 2006). 
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strategy generates significantly positive momentum returns in 10 out of the 20 international 
stock markets in their sample. 
Based upon a sample period of 1965 to 2008, Bhootra and Hur (2013) find further 
evidence of significant profits with the 52-week-high momentum strategy, and add a recency 
measure to refine the broad nearness to the 52-week-high price. This recency strategy of is 
distinguished by the notion of proximity to the 52-week-high price (i.e., the number of days 
since a stock has attained its 52-week-high price). By adding this recency measure, they find 
that stocks that have recently attained the 52-week-high price subsequently outperform those 
that have attained their 52-week-high price in the distant past by about 0.70% per month. 
Thus the addition of recency bias enhances the profitability of the 52-week-high price strategy 
of George and Hwang (2004).  
The existence of the 52-week-high price momentum profits can be attributed  towards 
information uncertainty in stocks (Burghof and Prothmann 2011) that lead to an increase in 
behavioural biases such as the anchoring and adjustment bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974)
3
. Burghof and Prothmann (2011) document that stocks nearer to and further from the 
52-week-high price have a higher degree of information uncertainty
4
, where information 
uncertainty refers to the state of scepticism about the impact of new information on a firm‘s 
fundamental value. This can surface due to lack of knowledge, quality of information, or 
implied riskiness of the firm‘s fundamentals (Zhang 2006). Burghof and Prothmann's (2011) 
proposition regarding the 52-week-high strategy is consistent with the studies of Daniel and 
Titman (1999) and Hirshleifer (2001), where psychological biases are greater when there is 
increasing information uncertainty about a set of stocks, and investors are slow to adjust their 
initial underreaction or overreaction to firm-specific information (Barberis et al. 1998, Daniel 
et al. 1998, and Hong and Stein 1999).  
In times of greater information uncertainty (embedded in stocks nearer to and further 
from the 52-week-high price), investors apply the 52-week-high price as a psychological 
―anchor‖ to assess the impact of new information about stocks, and are generally reluctant to 
update their beliefs (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 1998; Burghof and Prothmann 
                                                        
3
 Tversky and Kahneman (1974) document the tendency of humans to orientate strongly on reference points in 
order to reduce the complexity of making estimates and assessing probabilities. 
4
 Burghof and Prothmann (2011) employ six proxies of information uncertainty: (1) firm size (market value), (2) 
firm‘s book-to-market ratio, (3) distance between the 52-week-high price of a stock and its 52-week-low price, 
(4) stock-price volatility, (5) firm age and (6) cash-flow volatility. These proxies quantify uncertainty regarding 
the impact of news on the stocks‘ fundamental value. 
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2011). Similarly, Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) find strong positive correlation between 
profits from momentum strategies and information uncertainty, and suggest that information 
uncertainty partly explains the anomalies found in momentum trading profits. The collective 
findings from Burghof and Prothmann (2011) and Jiang et al. (2005) suggest that information 
uncertainty offers an important insight into the anomalies found in momentum trading profits. 
That is, the effect of information uncertainty on stocks, (i.e., volatility in stock prices) 
explains the rise of behavioural biases behind the 52-week-high strategy. 
 
2.2 Information Uncertainty and Analysts’ Forecast Revision 
 The sell-side equity analyst literature finds evidence of the importance of analysts‘ 
forecasts in reconnecting stock prices back to their fundamental values. Jegadeesh et al. 
(2004), and Barber et al. (2001) show that analysts play an instrumental role in the financial 
market by collecting and processing information about firms. Analysts have a number of 
informational advantages such as: (1) greater expertise and access to information on 
companies to make value-relevant recommendations to the public (Jung et al. 2012) (2) 
skillsets to incorporate salient information, such as firm-specific strategies, industry review, 
and macroeconomic outlook into their earnings forecasts (Wieland, 2011; Hong and Wu, 
2016) (3) ability to apply earnings forecasts as an avenue to provide their feedback on the 
relative degree of under- or over-valuation of the current stock price (Womack 1996). Thus, 
when analysts disseminate forecast revisions and stock recommendations to the market, there 
is an empirically observed stock price drift following the release of the earnings estimates
5
.  
 For example, Stickel (1991) document large-sample evidence of the post-forecast 
revision drift, where stocks with upward revisions consistently outperform stocks with 
downward revisions by 13% every 6-months. Similarly, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 
(1996) confirm the prevalence of the post-forecast revision drift by demonstrating stock price 
drift to mean forecast consensus of up to 6 months. However, they attribute the post-forecast 
revision drift phenomenon to a cumulative delayed response to new information by investors 
as investors inefficiently utilise and underestimate the information embedded in analysts‘ 
forecasts (e.g., Mendenhall 1991; Gleason and Lee 2003; Abarbanell and Bernard 1992).  
 These findings support the theory of conservatism bias (Barberis et al., 1998), where 
investors do not update their expectations adequately, and consequently adjust their initial 
                                                        
5
 For example, Barber et al. (2010) empirically document that a trading strategy based on the level and change in 
stock recommendation yields daily excess returns of 5.2 basis points. This suggests that the predictive power of 
stock recommendations is not dependent on the shift in investors‘ demand, but can be attributed to analysts‘ 
abilities to collect and process information on a firm‘s fundamental value. 
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under reaction behaviour. Hou, Hung, and Gao (2014) examine the relationship between 
analysts‘ earnings forecast revisions and information uncertainty in the Australian stock 
market returns. They find that investors react slower to analysts‘ forecast revisions when there 
is a higher degree of information uncertainty for stocks, and during bear markets. This finding 
implies that the persistence of stock mispricing is contingent on the degree of uncertainty in 
firm-specific information (Jiang et al. 2005; Burghof and Prothmann 2011). Based on this 
existing literature, we further analyse whether the mean of analysts‘ earnings forecast revision 
is a good predictor for future stock returns. The first hypothesis (stated in the alternative form) 
is: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Stock prices drift in the direction of analysts’ earnings forecast revisions 
The pervasiveness of the post-forecast revision drift may not be due to an incomplete 
reaction by investors alone, but by analysts underreacting to new information and failing to 
incorporate value-relevant information into their forecasts. A number of studies have find that 
analysts‘ forecasts are inefficient as they do not fully incorporate past information available at 
the time of their forecasts (Klein 1990; Chen et al. 2015), and subsequently underreact to new 
information by anchoring onto their previous forecasts (Campbell and Sharpe 2009). If 
analysts are efficient information intermediaries, we should expect their forecasts to precede 
or coincide with public information (Wieland 2011).  However, there are alternative views.  
Zhang (2006) and Gu and Xue (2007) examine the effects of information uncertainty 
and analysts‘ forecast revisions, and find a positive correlation between information 
uncertainties and forecast errors, where stocks with greater uncertainty are found to have 
more subsequent forecast revisions. This evidence supports the pervasiveness of information 
uncertainty, that causes analysts to delay their incorporation of firm-specific information into 
their earnings forecasts (Daniel et al. 1998). Intuitively, analysts underreact more to revising 
their prior forecasts in cases of greater uncertainty. In relation to stocks with lower levels of 
information uncertainty, however, analysts revise their prior forecasts promptly and almost 
completely in response to new information.
6
 In addition, Bradshaw (2002, 2004) suggests that 
the value of analysts‘ recommendations is in fact uninformative. He finds that analysts‘ 
recommendations are primarily dominated by stocks with high growth expectations (despite 
growth rates being reflected in stock prices), and notes that their forecasts are either unrelated 
                                                        
6
 These findings are consistent with Daniel et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999), who attribute the rise of the 
momentum effect and behavioural biases to the slow dissemination of information in the market. 
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or negatively correlated with fundamental analysis models (e.g., residual income valuations) 
that are known to predict future returns.  
 Jegadeesh et al. (2004) investigate whether analysts incorporate common information 
metrics into their earnings forecasts, and show that quarterly changes in analysts‘ consensus 
recommendations are positively associated with high-momentum and high-growth stocks. 
That is, stocks that receive more favourable revisions tend to have higher price-momentum 
signals, although this association is less obvious for contrarian signals. Moreover, Jegadeesh 
et al. (2004) find that analysts do not take advantage of the various known stock 
characteristics to predict stock returns (Abarbanell and Bernard 1992; Finger 2003; Stickel 
2007), and that the implications of analysts‘ forecasts are in line with economic incentives 
faced by sell-side brokerage firms.  
These ―economic incentives‖ can also be referred to as the ―conflicts of interest‖ faced 
by analysts, to (1) attract investment banking and brokerage revenue and (2) curry favour with 
managers. An understanding of the conflicts of interest offers an interesting insight into why 
analysts are pressured to underweight (overweight) their negative (positive) private 
information, and why they tend to be overly optimistic in their forecasts (Ivković and 
Jegadeesh 2004; Muslu and Xue 2013; Chen et al. 2015). For example, Ivković and Jegadeesh 
(2004), and Zhang (2006), find that analysts revise their estimates downward to a greater 
degree following bad news than upward following good news
7
. Similarly, Chen et al. (2015) 
demonstrate that the forecast revision momentum and post-forecast revision price drift are 
more conspicuous for downward forecast revisions than upward revisions. These collective 
findings suggest that analysts have differential access to good and bad news, and hence a 
longer price drift is typically observed in downward forecast revisions. In other words, 
analysts have early access and regular guidance from managers about positive news prior to 
the earnings announcements, so that firms can meet or beat the consensus recommendations 
and avoid negative earnings surprise (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002; Matsumoto 2002). 
 To conclude, analysts can still facilitate market efficiency with their responsive 
forecast revisions, and can provide value-relevant information for investors (Zhang 2008). 
Nevertheless, analysts are susceptible to heuristic behavioural biases
8
. There is an inclination 
for analysts to be overly optimistic and to underreact to bad news when correcting their 
                                                        
7
 Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) document that as nearing to the earnings announcement date, there is an 
observed decrease in forecast errors (i.e., improved accuracy) for upward forecast revisions over the weeks. 
8
 The three main types of behavioural biases manifested in analysts‘ earnings forecasts include leniency 
(optimism), representativeness (overconfidence), and anchoring (underreaction) biases, all of which have been 
highlighted by Amir and Ganzach (1998) and are evident in the behavioural finance literature. 
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forecasts. However, when the earnings announcement period approaches, this optimistic bias 
diminishes as analysts have more indicators for adjusting their prior forecasts and justifying 
their downward revisions
9
. This suggests that post-forecast revision drift is associated with a 
mispricing anomaly and information uncertainty, rather than missing risk factors (Jiang et al. , 
2005). Furthermore, the asymmetry in post-forecast revision drift suggests that analysts have 
differential access to good news and bad news in the period before an earnings announcement 
(Jegadeesh et al. 2004; Ivković and Jegadeesh 2004). Therefore, as (sell-side) analysts‘ 
experiences economic conflict of interest in their analysts‘ earnings forecasts, we would 
expect to observe an asymmetric pattern in post-forecast revision drift. The second hypothesis 
(stated in the alternative form) is therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Post-revision drift following good and bad news is asymmetric. 
Laksanabunsong (2015) proposes that stock prices continue to drift in the direction of 
forecast revisions when the forecasts are made by better performing analysts. That is, even in 
times of uncertainty, if a stock is covered by analysts whose forecasting performance is 
improving on aggregate, investors perceive the earnings forecast revisions on that stock to be 
more credible. Using a sample period of 1985 to 2013, Laksanabunsong (2015) documents 
significantly positive analysts‘ forecasting performance that can induce short-run stock price 
drift following the forecast revisions. 
We apply the research design of Laksanabunsong (2015) to incorporate analysts‘ 
recent performance into our study. As signals by better performing analysts
10
 are more 
credible and valued by investors (Jackson 2005), we should expect recently improved 
analysts‘ forecasting performance to accentuate stock price drift following these analysts‘ 
forecast revisions. Investors are likely to put greater weight on recommendations about stocks 
from better performing analysts. The third hypothesis (stated in the alternative form) is: 
Hypothesis 3: Positive analyst performance accentuates post-forecast revision drift. 
 
In an otherwise semi-strong-form efficient market, analysts can facilitate market 
efficiency by picking up indicators of 52-week-high momentum, and translate them to 
relevant and informative news for investors to explain future stock returns. Jegadeesh et al. 
                                                        
9
 Amir and Ganzach (1998), Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) show that relative forecast errors and stock returns 
monotonically converge over the months until the earnings announcement date. 
10
 Better performing analysts are those with lower updated analysts‘ forecast errors than the benchmarked 
analysts‘ forecast errors. 
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(2004) find that analysts‘ consensus recommendations are positively related to the  simple 
price-momentum strategy of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). In addition, Burghof and 
Prothmann (2011) show that stocks nearer to and further from the 52-week-high price have 
higher information uncertainty. If analysts have the ability to scrutinize stocks with 
information uncertainty as part of their profession (Barber et al. 2010; Wieland 2011), 
analysts‘ forecast revisions should encapsulate information uncertainty (Jiang et al. 2005; Hou 
et al. 2014). Ultimately, when uncertainty obscures investors‘ acumen, the guidance of 
forecast revision reaffirms the direction of the new information and compels investors to 
update their prior beliefs. Consequently, the fourth hypothesis (stated in the alternative form) 
is: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Analysts’ earnings forecast revisions have incremental explanatory power for 
future stock returns after momentum and information uncertainties are controlled for.  
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Our sample covers stocks in the U.S. market for the period January 1995 to December 
2014 from three primary data sources. First, daily stock prices for all common stocks listed on 
NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX with share code 10 and 11 from the CRSP database daily 
updated stock file. Following Bhootra and Hur (2013), we exclude stocks priced below $5 and 
stocks in the smallest NYSE size decile at the end of the portfolio formation month to ensure 
that results are not driven by illiquid and thinly traded stocks
1112
. We include live and dead 
stocks in our sample to ensure that our data are free of survivorship bias. This process gives 
us an initial sample size of 829,466 daily stock price observations.  
This data is merged with Compustat files to obtain the necessary accounting 
information (e.g., firms‘ book-to-market ratios and market capitalization). This reduces the 
sample to 364,586 observations. Finally, we use quarterly analysts‘ earnings forecast data 
from the I/B/E/S Thompson Reuters detailed forecast database. We (1) retain earnings 
forecasts that are announced before the actual earnings announcement date, (2) select only the 
latest forecast from the same analysts if there are multiple forecasts in the same month, and 
                                                        
11
 Bhootra (2011) suggest that the failure to exclude penny stocks from a sample can significantly alter the 
inferences drawn from empirical tests. Profits found in BH‘s momentum strategy remain consistent when the 
smallest NYSE size decile in the sample is included, but stocks priced below $5 have to be excluded. 
12
 Stock prices are adjusted for stock splits and dividends using the CRSP price adjustment factor. In addition, 
stocks must not have any missing prices or financial data. 
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(3) ensure that the review date
13
 is within 2 months of the actual earnings announcement date. 
This screening process ensures that our forecast observations are not potentially subjected to 
irregularities or erroneous data (Zhang 2008). After we merge the I/B/E/S database with 
CRSP and Compustat files, and remove duplicates and missing data, our final sample consists 
of 1410 firm-month observations. For a full description of the variables, please refer to 
Appendix A.    
 
3.1 Momentum Variables 
 To construct the winner and loser portfolios of 52-week-high strategy (GH)  and 
recency strategy (BH), we first rank stocks based on each strategy‘s ranking criterion at the 
end of the portfolio formation period month t.  
 
GH‘s proximity of current price to the 52-week-high price ratio is given by: 
                            
             
                
     (1) 
 
Consistent with GH, stocks are placed into quintiles according to their values from 
equation (1). A higher GH 52-week-high (WH) value indicates that the current price of stock j 
is closer to the 52-week-high price. If the current stock price at the end of the formation 
period is the 52-week-high price, then the 52WH ratio has the maximum value of 1. In this 
study, WHH (WHL) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if stocks are in the top (bottom) 
quintile portfolios based on GH‘s proximity ratio, and 0 otherwise.  
Thereafter, BH‘s recency ratio measure is as follows:   
 
                     
                                       
   
      (2) 
 
Consistent with BH, the recency ratio (RR) is inversely proportional to the number of 
days since the 52-week-high price. For example, if stock j has achieved (has not achieved) its 
52-week-high price at the end of the formation period month t, then the number of days since 
its 52-week-high price is 0 (364). RR would be the maximum (minimum) possible value of 1 
(0). Essentially, stocks that have recently attained the 52-week-high price would take higher 
values of the RR measure. In this study, RRH (RRL) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
stocks are ranked in the top (bottom) quintile portfolio based on BH‘s recency ratio, and 0 
                                                        
13
 Review date refers to the date when the forecast estimate was confirmed as accurate by I/B/E/S. 
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otherwise. 
3.2 Analyst Forecast Revisions and Analyst Performance 
We classify an analyst as an individual financial professional or department of a 
research organization that has the expertise to evaluate investments and put together earnings 
forecasts of securities for I/B/E/S. Motivated by Jegadeesh et al.‘s (2004) documentation that 
the change in analysts‘ stock recommendations (as opposed to the level) is incrementally 
useful to predict future stock returns, the main objective of our research is to examine whether 
the magnitude of forecast revisions plays an important role in facilitating market efficiency. 
Thus, we follow Chan et al. (1996), Zhang (2008) and Chen et al. (2015) and measure 
earnings forecast revision
14
.  
 
         
 
   
         
 
                
 
             
        (3) 
where:  
          
 
 is the monthly mean earnings forecast of stock j at month t;               
is stock j‘s prior month‘s stock price.  
 
A positive (negative) forecast revision would signal good (bad) news about the stock, 
and represent a favourable (unfavourable) recommendation. The top (bottom) 20% of stocks 
with the highest analysts‘ forecast revision variable value are included in the Buy revision 
(Sell revision) portfolio. Thereafter, we follow Laksanabunsong (2015) and measure analysts‘ 
recent forecasting performance as: 
 
                   
  
 
  
 
          
          
              
          (4) 
where: 
           
  is analyst i‘s earnings forecast on stock j at month t;          is actual 
realized earnings of stock j released at the next earnings announcement date; Term A 
represents the set of firms that analyst i covers that have earnings announcement dates 
available. Since we are measuring earnings forecast revision at the aggregate level, we 
                                                        
14
We measure forecast consensus revision as the change in monthly consensus mean forecasts so that it can be 
compatible with the measurement of the momentum variables, which ratios are measured on a monthly basis at 
portfolio formation month t. 
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compute an overall analyst performance of stock j by averaging analyst i’s recent forecasting 
performance at time t
15
.  
After we have computed analysts‘ average recent performance, we follow 
Laksanabunsong (2015) to measure positive analysts‘ performance in two stages as: 
 
              
 
 
 
  
  
 
   
                    
 
    
  
      (4) 
             
 
 
 
   
                    
 
                        (5) 
where: 
Bt is the number of analysts that cover stock j in month t
16
. ExpectedError is the 
average analyst performance on stock j at month t over the past year (12 months). This 
represents the expected intermediate-term performance or benchmark performance of analysts 
that are covering the stock at month t. UpdatedError is the stock‘s average analyst 
performance scaled by the number of analysts that cover stock j at month t, which also 
represents analysts‘ updated or short-term performance.  
The dummy variable positive performance (     ) equals 1 if UpdatedError (average 
short-term performance of the analysts) is less than ExpectedError (intermediate benchmark 
performance), and 0 otherwise. In other words, stocks that are covered by a better performing 
analyst have an average short-term forecast error lower than the average expected forecast 
error. 
 
3.3 Control Variables 
We use two sets of control variables: (1) standard stock characteristics that are known 
to predict stock returns (Fama and French 1993) and (2) additional stock characteristics that 
proxy for information uncertainty
17
 (Zhang 2006; Burghof and Prothmann 2011; Hou et al. 
2014).  
First, as per the momentum literature (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; George and 
Hwang, 2004; Bhootra and Hur, 2013), we include firm size as a control variable. Firm size is 
                                                        
15
 In another sense, the analysts‘ performance measure can also be described as the average analysts‘ forecast 
error measure. 
16
 Scaling by the number of analysts that cover stock j at month t allows us to compare between UpdatedError 
and ExpectedError of individual analysts covering stock j at month t. 
17
 Zhang (2006) describes information uncertainty as ―the ambiguity about new information and its implications 
on the stock‘s fundamental value, which can arise either due to the lack of quality information or stock‘s 
volatility.‖ 
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a common risk factor and also a salient measure of information uncertainty. We control for 
prior month‘s stock returns in the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression approach as past 
returns contain information about future stock returns; thus, this controls for short-term price 
reversals (e.g., Grinblatt and Moskowitz, 2004), bid-ask bounce microstructure problems 
(Conrad and Kaul 1998) and behavioural biases (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993).   
Second, we employ three proxies for information uncertainty
18
. The foremost proxy 
for information uncertainty is book-to-market (BM) ratio. Fama and French (1993) and Daniel 
and Titman (1997) argue that growth stocks (lower BM ratio) are more volatile because they 
are heavily dependent on future growth possibilities and on research and development
19
. 
Another direct measure of information uncertainty is stock price volatility. Intuitively, if stock 
returns are increasingly unpredictable, they become harder to value, which results in a higher 
degree of information uncertainty (Daniel et al. 1998). The third proxy for information 
uncertainty is firm age. As older firms are generally larger, and richer in data and public 
information, they have a relatively lower degree of information asymmetry and uncertainty 
than newly listed firms (Barry and Brown 1985; Bessler and Bittelmeyer 2008). Moreover, 
Zhang (2006) suggest that firm age is an indirect measure of industry effects as the age of a 
firm is closely affiliated with the maturity of the industry.  
 
3.4  Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. Panel A presents the summary of monthly 
stock returns, which is the dependent variable used throughout our research. From the 
descriptive statistics, we observe that stock returns tend to cluster mainly around the mean 
(median) value of 0.76% (0.70%).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Panel B presents the momentum variables that are consistent with GH and BH. WHH 
(WHL) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if stocks are in the top (bottom) quintile portfolios 
based on GH‘s 52-week-high price ratio, and 0 otherwise. Likewise, RRH (RRL) is a dummy 
                                                        
18
 Burghof and Prothmann (2011) have associated stocks in the 52-week-high strategy with a higher level of 
information uncertainty and behavioural biases. To ensure that our key variables of interest are not driven by 
contemporaneous factors in the recency momentum strategy, we control for other explanations that could 
potentially lead to profits in the recency strategy. 
19
 Growth stocks are difficult to value as most of the earnings acquired are likely to be reinvested back into the 
firm for future development, and are therefore more risky (Daniel and Titman 1999). 
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variable that equals 1 if stocks are ranked in the top (bottom) quintile of BH‘s recency ratio, 
and 0 otherwise. The mean values of the momentum variables represent the frequency of 
stocks that are assigned to the winner and loser momentum portfolios respectively in our 
sample. For example, the mean of WHH is interpreted as 21.1% of the stocks in our sample 
having a current price that is close to their 52-week-high price. Similarly, 18.63% of the 
stocks in our sample have recently attained their 52-week-high price, and are therefore ranked 
in the RHH portfolio. 
Panel C presents the summary of analyst-related variables. The average mean forecast 
revision variable (Forecast Rev %) is –0.086%20. The median forecast revision of 0 also 
suggests that analysts do not frequently amend their monthly forecast. The mean average 
analyst performance variable (mean forecast error of the average analysts) implies that, on 
average, analysts are about 11% wrong in their estimates from the actual realized earnings.  
With respect to the positive performance measure, the average ExpectedError 
(intermediate benchmark error) has a mean of 0.0087%, and average UpdatedError (short-
term error) has a mean of 0.0073%
21
. Positive performance (Perf) has a mean value of about 
0.573. This indicates that for 57.3% of the stocks in our sample, analysts‘ short-term 
performance is better than the benchmark in this period. In other words, more than half the 
stocks in our sample are covered by better performing analysts who have recently improved 
the reliability and precision of their earnings forecasts. Overall, our descriptive statistics for 
analyst-related measures are relatively consistent with Chen et al. (2015) and Laksanabunsong 
(2015).  
Panel D presents the control variables used in our regressions. The mean size of firms in 
our sample is large, at $3,412 million. Book-to-market is evenly distributed around the mean of 
0.50. The mean of Volatilityt indicates that monthly stock returns on average fluctuate by 
2.52% over the past year. We follow Burghof and Prothmann (2011) and calculate firm age as 
the number of months since Compustat began covering the firm. Consistent with Burghof and 
Prothmann (2011), the average age of the firms in our sample is about 132 months, with the 
youngest (oldest) firm in our sample at 14 (249) months old.  
                                                        
20
 The negative mean forecast revision suggests that there are either generally more downward revisions or the 
magnitude of change in forecasts is greater for downward revisions than upward revisions (minimum value = –
16.6) at the aggregate level. In our findings, we show that the magnitude of downward revision are larger when 
more information becomes available, i.e., next earnings announcement period, and the negative mean forecast 
revision indicates that analysts revise their optimistic biases in the later months to a larger extent. 
21
As ExpectedError and UpdatedError is the proportioned by the corresponding number of analysts following 
the stock, thus, it is not surprising that these measures are of a small magnitude. 
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Panel E presents the descriptive statistics for the number of analysts that are following 
a particular stock and the number of firms that an analyst typically covers. These figures 
provide a gauge of the construct of the average positive performance (Perf) of analysts. We 
find that the mean number of analysts‘ coverage and firms being covered by analysts are 
relatively stable and evenly distributed across the years. Specifically, we observe that 
approximately 62 analysts follow an average stock, and an average analyst covers about 199 
different types of firms annually (across four quarters). This trend suggests that our mean 
earnings forecast revisions and recent analysts‘ performance are not driven by thinly weighted 
forecasts, i.e., one analyst representing the forecast consensus for the month. We provide the 
Pearson‘s correlation matrix of all key variables in Table B.1 of Appendix B.  According to 
Table B.1, the low-levels of correlation across our variables indicates that our study is 
unlikely to be affected by issues pertaining to multicollinearity. 
 
3.5 Research Method 
We adopt two empirical approaches in this study: (1) portfolio-level analysis and (2) 
multivariate panel-data regressions to support the study of the research questions. The 
portfolio-level analysis is an important analysis that examines the first-order documentation, 
and captures any potential nonlinear relations in the portfolio aggregation. The panel-data 
regression (or cross-sectional time-series data) provides second-order confirmation of the 
relationship documented in the portfolio-level analysis, and addresses any omitted or 
unknown variable issues that may potentially confound the results established in our study. 
 
3.5.1 Post-Forecast Revision Price Drift 
We create portfolios similar to George and Hwang (2004) who compare the Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) momentum strategy against the 52-week high strategy to calculate a 
Winner – Loser strategy.  However, our portfolios are based upon the analysis of whether 
analysts‘ monthly earnings forecast revision consensus are a good predictor for future stock 
returns. At the beginning of each month t, stocks are sorted into quintile portfolios based on 
the magnitude of forecast revision (Revisiont)
22
. We equally weight stocks in each portfolio, 
and report the holding-period returns to each forecast revision portfolios and the Buy-Sell 
                                                        
22
 Recall that the top 20% of stocks with the highest forecast revision value is included in BUY revision portfolio; 
the bottom 20% of stocks with the lowest forecast revision value is assigned to SELL revision portfolio. 
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revision strategy, and the corresponding Fama-French (1993) three-factor alphas to control for 
standard risk factors that can explain stock returns.  
 
We present analyses up to 5 months ahead, as post-forecast revision drift is a relatively 
short-term phenomenon with abnormal returns that lasts for at least 6 months (Stickel 1991; 
Chan et al. 1996). It is more economically meaningful to analyse short-term price drift, since 
we are measuring analysts‘ forecast revision consensus on a quarterly basis. Following our 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, if indeed investors inefficiently underreact to information in 
analysts‘ forecasts, we would expect to find evidence of post-forecast revision drift 
(Hypothesis 1), consistent with prior studies (e.g., Gleason and Lee 2003; Chen et al. 2015). 
Furthermore, we expect to see an asymmetric pattern of stock price drift following upward 
and downward revisions (Hypothesis 2).  
 
3.5.2 Profitability of the Recency Momentum Strategy 
To measure profits from the momentum strategy, we follow JT and BH to implement 
an overlapping (6-1-6) momentum strategy where stocks are ranked and then placed into 
quintiles based on their past 6-month returns to BH‘s RR measure over the months t-6 to t-1. 
At the end of portfolio formation month t-1, stocks ranked at the top (bottom) 20% of the RR 
measure are assigned to the winner RRH (loser) RRL portfolio. The stocks are subsequently 
held in their recency portfolios for the next 6 months (from month t to t+6), after imposing a 
1-month gap between the portfolio formation period and the holding period (month t-1 to t) to 
alleviate any microstructure issues, such as the bid-ask bounce effect or interaction with other 
momentum strategies (GH; BH; Hao et al. 2015). We then calculate and report the 6-month 
equal-weighted returns and corresponding Fama-French (1993) three-factor alphas for stocks 
in the recency strategy (RRH – RRL), and returns for each of the recency portfolios.  
 
3.5.3 Portfolio Formation for Two-Way Portfolio-Level Analysis and Panel Regression 
To measure the first-order relationship between recency strategy and analysts‘ forecast 
revisions, we sort stocks according to BH‘s recency ratio and analysts‘ earnings forecast 
revision.  Stocks in BH‘s recency portfolios are ranked into quintiles based on their past 6-
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months returns to BH‘s RR measure over the month t-6 to t-1 23 . Correspondingly, 
measurement of stocks in the forecast revision portfolios is based on the magnitude of change 
in forecast at the beginning of month t. To measure the first-order relationship between 
recency strategy and analysts‘ forecast revisions, we sort stocks according to BH‘s recency 
ratio and analysts‘ earnings forecast revision.  presents the timeline to better illustrate the 
portfolio allocation process of the recency and forecast revision measures respectively. 
The staggered configuration for the portfolio-formation arrangement is motivated by 
Zhang (2008), who finds that both the timing and magnitude of forecast revisions are 
important aspects of the analysts‘ forecast that can help facilitate market efficiency. By 
forming a forecast revision portfolio 1-month ahead of the momentum portfolios, we develop  
a tractable model to test whether analysts are able to pick up momentum indicators, and make 
subsequent forecast revisions that contribute to explaining future stock returns (Jegadeesh et 
al. 2004). This staggered arrangement has the added benefit of preventing endogeneity issues 
(i.e., analysts‘ forecast revisions drive the price-momentum effect). 
Using a dependent variable of up to 3 months ahead allows for the evaluation of the 
market‘s asymmetric reaction to good and bad news. Good (bad) news can be represented by 
stocks in the recency strategy, where stocks with the most recent (distant) 52-week-high price 
                                                        
23
 The positioning of momentum variables at month t-1 also allows us impose a 1-month gap between the 
forecast revisions and momentum variables to prevent bid-ask bounce microstructure effects, which is consistent 
with prior literature (e.g., JT, GH, and BH). 
Figure 1 - Timeline for Portfolio Analysis 
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in the RRH (RRL) portfolio continues to earn positive (negative) excess returns (BH; Hao et 
al. 2015).   
 
3.5.4 Panel Regression 
We use panel regressions to assess whether analysts‘ forecast revisions can predict 
future stock returns, after controlling for momentum and information uncertainty factors 
(Hypothesis 4). This multivariate regression approach allows us to conveniently include any 
variables (e.g., for Hypothesis 3, positive analysts‘ performance), and compare the source of 
returns predictability between the portfolios in the momentum strategy and forecast revision 
portfolios separately. Furthermore, the setup of the regression model allows us to examine the 
asymmetric pattern of stock price continuation following upward and downward forecast 
revisions (Hypothesis 2).  
 
3.5.4.1 Baseline Momentum Model 
Consistent with BH and Hao et al. (2015), the baseline momentum model for this 
study is as follows: 
 
                                                               
                                                                        
                                                   (8) 
 
where: 
       is stock returns in month t;                    is the 52-week-high winner (loser) 
portfolio;                     is the Recency Ratio winner (loser) portfolio;              is 
firm size. Subscripts j, t, and p represent stock j, time t and p = month t+1 to t+3 (For a full 
description of the variables, please refer to Appendix A.). 
 In the regression approach, future stock returns in month t+1, month t+2, and month 
t+3 are the dependent variables in three different panel-data regressions, each representing the 
holding period           The control variables are positioned in relation to the dependent 
variable at time      , and the momentum variables are taken at month t-1. A simple 
illustration follows : If measuring stock returns at month t+2 (p = 2), size is taken at month 
t+1 and the momentum variables remain at month t-1. Using this 3-month (one-quarter) ahead 
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analysis, we are able to extend the work of BH and Hao et al. (2015), and examine the 
explanatory power of the momentum variables at different stages of the future that is 
consistent with the portfolio-level analysis.  
 
BH suggest that the addition of recency bias causes investors to underreact further, 
and thus accentuating profits to GH‘s 52-week-high strategy. Therefore, the coefficients on 
WHH*RRH and WHH*RRL refer to BH‘s recency of the 52-week-high price strategy, and 
WHL*RRH and WHL*RRL refer to recency of the 52-week low strategy (BH; Hao et al. 
2015). Consistent with GH and BH, we expect the coefficients of the winner (loser) 
momentum portfolios to be positively (negatively) related to explain future stock returns.  
 
3.5.4.2 Main Regression with Forecast Revision (without positive performance) 
We form the following regression model to examine whether analysts are important 
information intermediaries in the market that can help explain future stock returns, after we 
have controlled for momentum and information uncertainty variables (Hypothesis 4).   
 
       
                                                                     
                                                                           
                                                                          
                                       (9) 
 
where: 
       .is Buy revision;         is Sell revision. 
 
3.5.4.3 Main Regression with Forecast Revision (with positive performance) 
To examine the incremental effect of positive analysts‘ performance        , we 
extend model (9) and incorporate the positive performance variable to forecast revisions into 
the regression to form model (10).  
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            (10) 
where: 
        is positive performance. 
If analysts are able to pick up momentum signals and translate their forecast revisions 
as news for investors, we would expect forecast revisions to explain future stock returns after 
controlling for momentum and information uncertainty variables (Hypothesis 4). Thus, 
        would be significantly positive (negative) in the regression model (9).  
As prior research shows that information on stocks that are covered by better 
performing analysts are perceived to be more credible (Laksanabunsong 2015; Jackson 2005), 
following Hypothesis 3, we predict that the inclusion of positive performance would improve 
the coefficient and significance of         relative to model (10). Motivated by Barber et al. 
(2001) and Jegadeesh et al.‘s (2004) observation that analysts tend to make stock 
recommendations that are favourably correlated with positive momentum stocks, we also 
restrict our sample to stocks in the recency strategy (RRH and RRL portfolios) as part of the 
regression analysis. 
In summary, the regressions extend the results from the portfolio-level analysis. The 
inclusion of information uncertainty variables ensures that our results are not driven by 
contemporaneous or omitted factors. Moreover, the examination of stock returns at months 
t+1, t+2, and t+3 allows us to conduct a formal statistical analysis of whether the magnitude 
of analysts‘ earnings forecast revisions can predict future stock returns at different stages, 
after controlling for the recency and information uncertainty indicators (Hypothesis 4). It also 
permits us to capture the asymmetric pattern of forecast revision variables (Hypothesis 2) and 
the pervasiveness of sell-side analysts‘ optimistic bias.  
Furthermore, the examination of in-sample quarter-ahead (dependent variable) returns 
allows us to evaluate the market‘s asymmetric reaction to good and bad news. Good (bad) 
news can be represented by stocks in the recency strategy, where stocks with the most recent 
(distant) 52-week-high price in the RRH (RRL) portfolio continues to earn positive (negative) 
excess returns (BH; Hao et al. 2015). 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Post-Forecast Revision Price Drift 
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[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
We test whether quarterly analysts‘ forecast revision consensus are a good predictor 
for future stock returns in the first part of the portfolio-level analysis. Panel A and Panel B of 
Table 2 report the holding-period returns and Fama-French three-factor alphas respectively up 
to 5 months ahead. Consistent with the literature, our findings demonstrate that a self-funded 
investment strategy (last row of each panel) that simultaneously longs stocks in the Buy 
revision and short-sells stocks in the Sell revision portfolios is profitable and highly 
significant. In addition, the returns are monotonically increasing with time. The corresponding 
Fama-French three-factor alphas presented in Panel B are consistent with results using raw 
returns. 
For robustness, we disaggregate our sample into decile portfolios as shown in Panel C. 
From Panel C, we observe that there is greater stock price drift impounded in the Sell revision 
portfolio than the Buy revision. For the Buy revision, stock returns in the first 3 months are 
3.07%, 4.30%, and 6.4% respectively. On the other hand, the decrease in stock returns 
following the Sell earnings forecast revision is gradual, where there is continued stock price 
drift in the direction of unfavourable news over a period of months. 
Table 2 provides support for Hypothesis 1. We observe post-forecast revision drift in 
the US market in the short and intermediate term, and have established the profitability of the 
Buy-Sell revision strategy that is consistent with prior literature. The findings from Fama-
French adjusted alphas indicate that excess returns are not affected by their exposure to risks. 
Moreover, we find that the pattern of stock price drift is larger following downward revisions 
than upward revisions. Consistent with Chen et al. (2015), the market reaction to downward 
revisions tends to be slower.  
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This finding suggests that investors do not correctly process the implications of 
analysts‘ forecast revisions and exhibit a more significant delay in response to bad news than 
good news.   
 
 
4.2 Year-by-Year analysis of Post-Forecast Revision Drift 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
We evaluate the year-by-year performance of the Buy-Sell strategy over the next 3 
months based on forecast revisions. We examine for exogenous factors such as the 2003 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) and the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC)/Great 
Recession (GR). 
Analysts collect information independently from public or private sources. For 
example, analysts can collect inside information from managers of the firms that they have a 
personal connection with. This early information advantage to analysts has drawn 
considerable regulatory attention. On 23 October 2003, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) adopted Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) to stamp out ―selective 
disclosure‖, in which companies give material information only to a few analysts and 
institutional investors prior to disclosing it publicly
24
. Gomes, Gorton, and Madureira (2004) 
show that the adoption of Reg FD has caused a significant shift in analyst attention, resulting 
in welfare loss and a higher cost of capital for smaller firms. Chen et al. (2015) found that the 
post-Reg FD period is associated with lower forecast revision momentum. This suggests that 
we might expect to observe lower stock price drift following analysts‘ forecast revisions for 
the period of post-Reg FD.  
                                                        
24
 The Reg FD essentially mandates publicly traded companies to disclose material information to all investors 
simultaneously, and it would adversely affect the competitive advantage of analysts over investors. 
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The next critical event to consider is the GFC/GR. The GFC/GR almost all developed 
countries into recession, including the U.S. (Claessens, Kose, and Terrones 2010), thus we 
would expect stock returns to be adversely affected during the post-GFC/GR period 
The findings from Table 8 indicate that the sensitivity of stock returns to forecast 
revisions has been relatively stable over the years, except for the post-GFC/GR period. The 
second and third month holding-period returns in the Buy-Sell strategy increase to about 8% 
and more than 10% respectively in the year 2007 and 2008. This is largely driven by the 
decline in stock returns following the Sell revision. In contrast to the post-GFC period, it is 
difficult to make inferences about the enactment of Reg FD as most stock returns during this 
period are insignificant. This is due to the reduction of the number of consensus forecasts per 
year when the sample is split into annual observations. 
Overall, returns from the Buy-Sell strategy for the GFC/GR period are higher, which is 
mainly driven by returns following the Sell revision. We do not find evidence of post-Reg FD 
affecting our results.  
 
4.3 Profits to the Recency Strategy 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
In Section 4.1, we established the existence of post-forecast revision price drift. We 
now examine stock returns to the recency strategy to validate our RR measure prior to 
exploring the interaction between the recency strategy and analysts‘ earnings forecast 
revisions. In Table 3, We present the 6-month ahead holding-period returns after portfolio 
formation on month t-1 (with a 1-month imposition gap).  
The results are statistically significant and consistent with BH. The RRH (RRL) 
portfolio earns monthly returns of 0.25% (0.08%) on average, and profits to the recency 
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strategy (RRH – RRL) are 0.164% per month at the 1% significance level. Correspondingly, 
the adjusted Fama-French alpha is 4.27% per month.  
Our results continue to be consistent with the outcomes documented by Bhootra and 
Hur (2013) despite the difference in sample periods. Returns increase almost monotonically 
from the loser (RRL) to winner (RRH) portfolio. Thus, our results align our methodology 
with prior literature to exemplify that profits from the recency strategy are indeed predictable 
and significant. 
4.4 Portfolio-level Analysis between Forecast Revision and Recency Measure 
 
4.4.1 Empirical Evidence of Analysts’ Behavioural Biases 
 
We investigate the average absolute analysts‘ performance (mean forecast errors) 
following good and bad news
25
. Although our findings in Section 4.1 have demonstrated an 
asymmetric pattern, we need to ascertain whether the results stem from analysts‘ optimistic 
bias and differential access to good and bad news. If indeed analysts underreact to new 
information when revising their forecasts, their adjustment in earnings forecast would be 
insufficient and this would be captured by positive forecast errors. Subsequently, since 
analysts underreact to a larger extent to downward revisions, we would expect more forecast 
errors in the downward revision portfolio (Zhang 2006).  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Table 4 and Figure 2 report the average absolute analysts‘ performance (forecast 
errors) for stocks sorted independently according to the recency ratio (RR) measure and 
forecast revision ranking. The findings demonstrate that analysts underreact to new 
information from earnings announcements, and the average forecast errors are significantly 
                                                        
25
 After demonstrating differential monthly returns to stocks in the recency portfolios and established profits 
from the recency strategy, stocks with the most recent (distant) 52-week-high price in RRH (RRL) portfolio can 
be related to good (bad) news.   
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higher in the extreme recency portfolios, i.e., stocks in the RRH and RRL portfolios. This 
indicates that, in cases of information uncertainty, analysts display more noticeable 
behavioural biases and are slower to revise their forecast revisions (Jiang et al. 2005; Zhang 
2006).  
The average absolute performance (forecast errors) for the Sell revision portfolio is 
higher than any of the other revision portfolios (in the first column of Table 5). Of particular 
interest, the Sell/RRL loser portfolio displays the highest level of forecast error at 1.31%. This 
finding indicates that analysts are generally more reluctant to revise their downward forecast 
revisions and exhibit higher forecast errors following bad news in earnings announcements. 
Alternatively, the Buy/RRH winner portfolio (the last column of Table 5) exhibits an average 
absolute forecast error of 0.66%, that is half of the Sell/RRL loser portfolio
26
.  
Overall, the analysis of analysts‘ performance (forecast errors) allows us to isolate the 
behavioural biases attributable to analysts rather than investors. The findings support the 
notion that analysts make timelier upward forecast revisions following good news, and 
incorporate this positive private information into their stock recommendations. However, on 
average, they are slower to revise their downward revisions following bad earnings 
announcement news. These findings are consistent with the optimistic bias in Hypothesis 2, 
and demonstrate that information uncertainty is likely to be greater when firms face bad news 
(i.e., stocks are ranked in the RRL portfolio).  
Furthermore, the findings from the average forecast errors (Table 3) and post-forecast 
revision drift (Table 2) suggest that the underlying cause of post-forecast revision drift is not 
entirely caused by investors‘ underreaction behaviour, but a series of underreactions by 
analysts. In other words, the failure of analysts to fully incorporate information in earnings 
                                                        
26
 Although the analysts‘ absolute forecast errors in the Buy revision portfolios are systematically lower than its 
extreme counterpart (Sell revision), they are still marginally higher than the other portfolios in Table 5. This 
suggests that stocks in the RRH and RRL portfolios have high levels of information uncertainty (Zhang 2006).  
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announcements has a spillover effect on to investors that explains the post-forecast revision 
drift anomaly (Chen et al. 2015).  
4.4.2 Two-Way Portfolio-Level Analysis between Recency Ratio and Forecast Revision 
Measures 
 
We conduct the same two-way portfolio-level analysis, by sorting stocks 
independently according to their recency ratio (RR) measure and forecast revision measure. 
Table 5 presents the holding-period returns and Fama-French alpha up to 3 months ahead; 
Figure C.1 in Appendix C graphically represents Table 5.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
We observe that the return to the Buy/RRH winner portfolio is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that analysts are able to extract good news from the 
recency momentum strategy and earn positive holding-period returns for the next 3 months. 
Specifically, the Buy/RRH winner portfolio earns holding-period returns of 10.11%, 13.04% 
and 17.46% (Panels A, B, and C) in the following 1, 2, and 3 months. The corresponding 
Fama-French three-factor adjusted alphas to Buy/RRH portfolios are consistent.   
Conversely to the winner portfolio, the holding-period returns to the Sell/RRL loser 
portfolio are significantly positive at 3.88% in the first month (Panel A), but gradually decline 
to –0.97% (Panel B) and –7.7% (Panel C) in the second and third month, respectively. These 
findings are interesting and provide additional support to earlier evidence regarding analysts‘ 
optimistic bias (e.g., Zhang 2006; Chen et al. 2015). Thus, analysts tend to underreact to 
unfavourable news and gradually revise their downward revisions over the months. 
Consequently, there is a larger stock price drift following downward forecast revisions than 
upward (Hypothesis 2). With regard to the corresponding Fama-French three-factor alphas, 
only the coefficient on the Sell/RRL portfolio is statistically significant at the 1% level at –
6.90% at the third month.  
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In summary, we find support that analysts are slower to revise their forecast revisions 
following bad news (stocks in the RRL portfolio). Analysts are able to pick up momentum 
signals throughout the quarter and make forecast revisions that are positively correlated with 
the positive momentum indicators (Hypothesis 4). Specifically, stocks listed in the winner 
portfolio (Buy/RRH portfolio) earn holding-period returns and Fama-French alphas that are 
consistently higher than stocks listed in the loser portfolio (Sell/RRL portfolio). 
 
4.4.3 Two-Way Portfolio-Level Analysis between Recency Ratio and Forecast Revision 
Measures with Positive Performance 
 
In this section, we incorporate analysts‘ positive performance (Perf) into the analysis 
to test Hypothesis 3. We expect stocks covered by better performing analysts to have higher 
post-forecast revision drift, as these analysts‘ forecasts are more accurate, which increases 
returns to forecast revisions (Laksanabunsong 2015). 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
In this analysis, we only include stocks with positive performance, there are 719 
observations in the sample. Table 6 presents the holding-period returns and corresponding 
Fama-French three-factor alphas for the next 3 months ahead
27
. Figure C.2 in Appendix C 
graphically represents Table 6. Panels A, B, and C of Table 6 show that the conditioning of 
stocks covered by better performing analysts has substantially increased holding-period 
returns for the next 3 months relative to the results shown in Table 5. Specifically, with the 
addition of the positive performance variable, returns to the Buy/RRH (with positive 
performance) winner portfolio increase by 2.64% for the first month, 0.05% for the second 
                                                        
27
 With reference to Table 1 (Descriptive Statistics), out of the 1410 observations in our sample, 57.29% of our 
stocks show positive performance (Perf = 1).  
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month, and 3.63% for the third month
28
. Similarly, the Fama-French three-factor alphas 
documented for the winner portfolios are statistically significant across the next 3 months. 
The Sell/RRL (with positive performance) loser portfolio represented in Table 6 exhibits a 
pattern in the holding-period returns identical to that in Table 5. That is, with or without the 
inclusion of positive performance, returns in the first month are significantly positive at 
4.88% (Panel A), but gradually decline to –7.94% (Panel C) in the third month.  
 
 
 
4.5 Multivariate Regressions on Stocks in the Recency Momentum Strategy 
Our analysis focuses on stocks assigned to the recency strategy portfolio (RRH and 
RRL portfolio). This tests whether analysts‘ forecast revisions can pick up indicators of the 
recency momentum strategy (Hypothesis 4). If analysts base their forecast revisions on 
evidence of price-momentum, then we would expect upward (downward) forecast revisions to 
explain future stock returns in the winner (loser) recency portfolio.  
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
Table 7 presents stock returns for month t+1, t+2, and t+3 respectively as the 
dependent variable. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report results of forecast revision portfolios 
without positive performance, and Columns (2), (4), and (6) include positive performance. 
Our sample comprises approximately 578 stocks in the RRH (RRL) portfolios. We control for 
information uncertainty, GH‘s 52-week-high momentum variables, firm and time fixed 
effects, and use robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
The results reported in Table 7 are consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 4. First, the 
coefficient of the Buy revision in Column (1) is 1.82% (t-statistic = 2.12), which signifies the 
                                                        
28
 In the first month, the incremental effect of positive performance is computed as 12.75% - 10.11% = 2.64%. 
The second month as 13.09% - 13.04% = 0.05%. The third month as 21.09% - 17.46% = 3.63%. 
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ability of upward revision to pick up good news in the recency strategy at month t+1. Within 
the portfolios covered in our study, the economic significance is that purchasing stocks with a 
Buy revision is an outperformance of 1.82% against a portfolio without a Buy revision.  This 
can lead to an annualized outperformance of 24%.  In Column (5) we observe that the 
coefficient of the Sell revision is –3.36% (t-statistic = –1.92), which denotes the predictability 
of downward revision at month t+3. Altogether, the asymmetric pattern exhibited in analysts‘ 
earnings forecast revisions is pervasive. The forecasting pattern of sell-side analysts remains 
largely unchanged to support Hypothesis 2. Specifically, analysts make timelier upward 
revisions (buy stocks in the RRH portfolio), but are generally more reluctant to recommend 
downward revisions (sell stocks in the RRL portfolio).  
An interesting finding from Column (5) is that the Buy revision is insignificant in the 
regression at month t+3. As there are greater uncertainties in stocks that form the recency 
strategy, analysts who subsequently revise their forecasts are likely to be herding upon earlier 
upward revision consensuses (Chen et al. 2015). Hence, only the foremost upward revision is 
informative, and the subsequent upward revisions bring less information to the market.  
Second, we find that the interaction of positive performance and the Buy revision 
portfolio in Column (2) substantially improves the information content of upward revisions at 
month t+1. The difference between the Buy revision without positive performance in Column 
(1) and the Buy*Perf revision with positive performance in Column (2) is 0.88% (2.70% – 
1.82%).   Within the portfolios covered in our study, the economic significance is that 
purchasing stocks with a Buy*Perf revision with positive performance is an outperformance 
of 2.70% against a portfolio without a Buy revision.  This can lead to an annualized 
outperformance of 38%.   
We do not find any significance in the forecast revision variables at month t+2. Since 
the Buy revision in Column (5) is insignificant, we expect not to find the Buy*Perf revision in 
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Column (6) predicting returns at month t+3. However, the Sell revision of –3.36% (t-statistic 
= –1.92) and the Sell*Perf revision of –3.74% (t-statistic = –2.53) in Columns (5) and (6) 
respectively are significant. Surprisingly, the interaction of positive performance and the Sell 
revision generates an incremental effect of -0.48%.  
Generally, the findings confirm the incremental effect of positive performance for 
upward revisions. However, the same conclusion cannot be drawn for Sell revisions. In Table 
7, we observe an increase in significance and coefficient magnitude when positive 
performance is added to the Sell revision.   We observe a close association between stocks in 
the 52-week-high strategy and stocks in the recency strategy. Specifically, the 52-week-high 
momentum variables are mostly statistically significant at the 1% level, except for month t+2 
where WHL is insignificant (in Columns 3 and 4). Furthermore, when we restrict our sample 
to stocks in the recency strategy, our findings suggest that analysts are able to pick up recency 
momentum signals at different stages to make forecast revisions that are instrumental in 
predicting profits from the recency strategy, even after controlling for information 
uncertainty. Perhaps analysts do not explicitly make predictions about the profitability of the 
recency strategy, but Jegadeesh et al. (2004) have shown that analysts generally favour stocks 
with positive price-momentum. Therefore, the findings from Table 7 suggest that analysts 
provide forecast revisions that are closely related to price-momentum indicators, and their 
ability to pick under- or over-valued stocks is an important source of information to reconcile 
the price-continuation momentum effect. The findings lend support to Hypothesis 4. 
Finally, Table 7 validates the incremental effects of positive performance for upward 
revisions in the short-term. For example, revisions on stocks that are covered by better 
performing analysts (who have lower short-term forecast errors than expected) are presumed 
to be generally more credible and precise (Laksanabunsong 2015). However, we find mixed 
results for downward revisions. Therefore, we find only partial support for Hypothesis 3 and 
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show that positive performance accentuates stock price drift following upward revisions, but 
not downward revisions. 
 
4.6 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IN RELATION TO HYPOTHESES 
The summary findings on the four hypotheses of this thesis are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Stock prices drift in the direction of analysts’ earnings forecast revisions. 
Our portfolio-level analysis shows that the holding-period returns following analysts‘ 
earnings forecast revisions monotonically increase with time, and the Buy-Sell strategy is 
profitable and statistically significant. Results using the corresponding Fama-French three-
factor alphas are consistent. As a result, our findings lend support to Hypothesis 1.  
Hypothesis 2: Post-revision drift following good and bad news is asymmetric. 
We find consistent results throughout our empirical analysis that upward (downward) 
forecast revision is positively (negatively) related to stock returns in the earlier (later) months. 
For example, the coefficient on Buy*Perf is positively significant at the first month across our 
tests. In contrast, the coefficient on the Sell revision does not hold explanatory power for 1-
month-ahead stock returns, and is negatively significant at the second month onwards. This 
collective evidence lends support to the asymmetric pattern observed in post-forecast revision 
drift following good and bad news, where we observe far more stock price drift in the Sell 
revision portfolio than the Buy revision (Ivković and Jegadeesh 2004; Chen et al. 2015). 
Overall, these findings lend support to Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3: Positive analyst performance accentuates post-forecast revision drift. 
We find that the addition of positive performance can induce short-term post-forecast 
revision drift only for stocks with upward revisions. However, the same incremental effect is 
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not found for downward revisions: we find mixed results in our analyses. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3 is supported for upward revisions but not for downward revisions.  
Hypothesis 4: Analysts’ earnings forecast revisions have incremental explanatory power for 
future stock returns after momentum and information uncertainties are controlled for. 
We find that upward (downward) forecast revision is persistently statistically 
significant in the earlier (later) months for stocks in our original sample and stocks in the 
recency strategy. Therefore, since analysts‘ forecast revisions have incremental explanatory 
power for future stock returns after momentum and information uncertainties are controlled 
for, our findings lend support to Hypothesis 4. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
We investigate whether sell-side equity analysts can facilitate market efficiency by picking up 
momentum indicators, thus providing value-relevant information for investors. The 
prevalence of the 52-week-high momentum anomaly can largely be reconciled with 
information uncertainty that drives the heuristic biases of investors (Burghof and Prothmann 
2011), and provides a fertile setting for examining the value and timing of forecast revisions 
(Jiang et al. 2005; Burghof and Prothmann 2011). Hong and Wu (2016) show that applying 
past stock returns with different time horizons improves the ability of firm fundamentals to 
explain stock prices.  They also find that firm fundamentals dominate stock price moments of 
small-sized firms during periods of high market uncertainty. 
Sell-side equity analysts‘ forecast revisions have been found to be inefficient. Amir 
and Ganzach (1998) show evidence of analysts‘ underreacting to stocks‘ fundamental value 
due to representative biases, and Zhang (2006) report a positive correlation between 
information uncertainty and analysts‘ forecast errors. Chen et al. (2015) find that analysts 
have strong incentives to herd to consensus or to the most recent revisions. Analysts are 
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known for their overly optimistic forecasting behaviour due conflicts of interest, where they 
are pressured to underweight (overweight) negative (positive) private information initially to 
improve relationships with management and attract both investment-banking and brokerage 
revenue (Ivković and Jegadeesh 2004; Muslu and Xue 2013).  
Despite the prevalence of analysts‘ biases, we premise that analysts‘ earnings forecast 
revisions can still facilitate market efficiency at different stages as analysts have the ability to 
identify under- or over-valued stocks and provide informed opinions to help reconnect 
mispriced stocks back to their fundamental value more efficiently (Womack 1996). The 
ability to influence investors is more pronounced if a stock with high information uncertainty 
is covered by better performing analysts. Consistent with prior research, we expect analysts to 
be slower in their response to stocks with bad news (e.g., a RRL portfolio), and we 
subsequently observe that analysts revise their estimates downward to a greater degree.  Thus, 
when uncertainty obscures the acumen of investors (i.e., stocks with the most recent or distant 
52-week-high price), analysts can play the vital role of an information intermediary by 
picking up indicators of momentum and therefore provide valuable signals of the stocks‘ 
future value.  
 We find that stock prices drift in the direction of analysts‘ forecast revisions as the 
holding-period returns following analysts earnings forecast monotonically increase with time.  
Our analyses also shows that that upward (downward) forecast revision is positively 
(negatively) related to stock returns in the earlier (later) months.  Thus, there is an asymmetric 
pattern observed in post-forecast revision drift following good and bad news such that there is 
greater stock price drift in the Sell revision portfolio than the Buy revision.  In the year-by-
year analysis of post-forecast revision drift, our results show that returns from the Buy-Sell 
strategy for the 2007-2008 GFC/GR period are higher, that is mainly driven by returns 
following the Sell revision. We do not find evidence of 2003 post-Reg FD affecting our 
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results. Last, our multivariate regression analysis shows that analysts‘ forecast revisions have 
incremental explanatory power for future stock returns after momentum and information 
uncertainties are controlled for  upward revisions. 
Finally, for investors, the implications of our study that analysts have the ability to 
pick up momentum indicators and therefore stocks with potential value. However, the caveat 
is that analysts are often pressured to balance the costs and benefits in their forecasts, and tend 
to exhibit a more significant delay in reacting to bad news than good news. (Ivković and 
Jegadeesh 2004; Muslu and Xue 2013; Chen et al. 2015). As a result, it is difficult for 
investors to discern the timing of a true sell recommendation. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the key variables in the full sample. Panels A and D present the dependent and control variables in the regression respectively. Panel 
B presents the momentum variables that are consistent with GH and BH. Panels C and E present the summary of analyst-related variables obtained from I/B/E/S. In each month t, 
stocks are ranked into quintiles on their past 6-months GH‘s proximity to 52-week-high (WH) ratio and BH‘s recency ratio (RR). WHH (WHL) is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if stocks are ranked in the top (bottom) quintile portfolios based on GH‘s 52WH ratio, and 0 otherwise. RRH (RRL) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if stocks are ranked in the 
top (bottom) quintile of BH‘s RR, and 0 otherwise. Forecast revision is a percentage and is the change in mean earnings forecast between month t and the previous month, scaled 
by previous month‘s stock price. Analysts‘ Performance measures the recent forecasting performance of analysts and is computed as the average forecast error of analyst i, scaled 
by beginning year stock price. ExpectedError is measured as the average Analysts‘ Performance on stock j at month t over the past 12 months and scaled by the number of 
analysts that cover stock j. UpdatedError is the short-term forecasting performance of an average analyst as a percentage, computed as the average Analysts‘ Performance on 
stock j at month t scaled by number of analysts that cover stock j. Positive Performance (Perf) represents stocks that are covered by better performing analysts, and equals 1 if 
UpdatedError is less than ExpectedError, and 0 otherwise. Returnst-1month is the prior month‘s returns. Sizet-1month is the log of market capitalization (in millions) of stock j at the 
end of previous month. Book to Markett-1 year is the book-to-market ratio. Volatilityt-1year is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the past year. Firm Age is the 
firm‘s age. For full description of the variables, please refer to Appendix A. The sample consists of stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ for the period January 1995 to 
December 2014. 
Variables Obs Mean SD Min p25 Median p75 Max 
Panel A: Dependent Variable 
Returnst 1410 0.0076 0.1189 -0.2982 -0.0596 0.0070 0.0709 0.4057 
         
Panel B: Momentum Variable 
WHH 1410 0.2110 0.4082 0 0 0 0 1 
WHL 1410 0.1672 0.3733 0 0 0 0 1 
RRH 1410 0.1863 0.3895 0 0 0 0 1 
RRL 1410 0.2166 0.4121 0 0 0 0 1 
         
Panel C: Analysts’ Forecast Variable (%) 
Forecast Rev (%) 1410 -0.0861 1.1676 -16.6065 -0.1654 0.0000 0.1171 11.6698 
Analyst Performance 1410 0.1107 0.1684 0.0000 0.0200 0.0505 0.1298 1.9348 
Expected Error (%) 1410 0.0087 0.0370 0.0000 0.0006 0.0021 0.0058 1.0323 
Updated Error (%) 1410 0.0073 0.0456 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0028 1.5432 
Perf 1410 0.5729 0.4947 0 0 1 1 1 
         
Panel D: Control Variables 
Returnst-1month 1410 0.0079 0.1079 -0.3022 -0.0513 0.0124 0.0655 0.3566 
Sizet-1month 1410 8.1351 1.5879 3.8661 6.8620 8.1441 9.4529 13.1815 
Book to Markett-1 year 1410 0.5141 0.3480 0 0.2523 0.4520 0.7097 2.4696 
Volatilityt-1year 1190 0.0252 0.0116 0.0073 0.0169 0.0227 0.0310 0.1083 
Firm Age 1410 132.2769 66.8731 14 75 135 189 249 
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Panel E: Descriptive Statistics on Analysts 
 Number of analysts following each firm  Set of Firms that Analysts i covers 
Year Mean Minimum P25 Median P75 Maximum  Mean Minimum P25 Median P75 Maximum 
1995 51.238 4 7 12 54 288  189.143 12 30 128 218 988 
1996 42.964 2 9 18.5 54 172  138.643 3 37 86 163 696 
1997 49.971 2 10 33 64 306  205.314 3 30 84 268 1717 
1998 52.290 4 17 48 80 132  324.710 13 50 148 458 1688 
1999 70.875 2 9.5 26.5 105 640  230.175 11 51 119.5 271 1381 
2000 80.781 5 12 28 110 440  215.563 12 45.5 106.5 262.5 1480 
2001 63.220 4 14 26 78 352  194.920 4 18 88 286 1072 
2002 68.023 4 12 30 74 456  186.442 4 26 84 139 1717 
2003 62.702 4 11 22 64 636  154.070 4 58 97 242 664 
2004 70.694 2 18 39 78 319  174.016 7 35 90 206 1524 
2005 60.025 2 12.5 28 66 341  227.800 5 35 97 277 1524 
2006 67.512 3 13 24.5 69 328  195.726 4 50.5 99 279.5 1171 
2007 80.696 7 20 36 78 480  192.570 7 56 124 254 1524 
2008 55.369 3 11 24 64 450  185.680 4 52 110 202 1171 
2009 54.010 3 17 25 78 253  242.381 6 55 115 267 1480 
2010 70.149 4 16 25 64 715  256.483 3 57 140 310 1524 
2011 78.023 5 16 32 72 539  222.953 6 53 117 226 1171 
2012 59.892 3 11 25.5 52 594  177.784 3 48 105 236 1072 
2013 52.908 1 13.5 28.5 53 385  162.513 2 24 111.5 194 1078 
2014 52.219 3 13 22 38 594  105.578 2 23 52.5 122 590 
Average 62.178 3.350 13.125 27.675 69.750 421  199.123 5.75 41.7 105.1 244.050 1261.600 
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Panel C: Holding-Period Returns in Deciles 
Decile N 1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 
1 (Sell) 77 
0.0015 
(0.15) 
-0.0187 
(-1.50) 
-0.0251 
(-1.46) 
-0.0302 
(-1.55) 
-0.0464** 
(-2.49) 
2 70 
-0.0215 
(-1.44) 
-0.0201 
(-1.47) 
-0.0274 
(-1.36) 
-0.0121 
(-0.53) 
-0.0033 
(-0.12) 
3 66 
0.0017 
(0.18) 
0.0105 
(0.78) 
0.0300 
(1.57) 
0.0319 
(1.54) 
0.0398* 
(1.75) 
4 68 
-0.0084 
(-0.88) 
0.0089 
(0.72) 
0.0292 
(1.65) 
0.0315* 
(1.77) 
0.0538** 
(2.27) 
5 70 
0.0024 
(0.23) 
0.0306** 
(2.25) 
0.0510*** 
(2.92) 
0.0634*** 
(3.32) 
0.0612*** 
(3.32) 
Table 2: Stock Returns Following Analysts' Forecast Revision Portfolio 
This table presents the 5-months ahead average monthly portfolio returns following analysts‘ forecast revisions. Panels 
A and B report the holding-period returns and the corresponding Fama-French three-factor alphas in quintile portfolios 
respectively. Panel C reports holding-period returns in decile portfolios. Buy (Sell) revision is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the change in forecast is ranked in the top (bottom) portfolio at month t, and 0 otherwise. For full description of 
the variable, please refer to Appendix A. The sample consists of stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ for the 
period January 1995 to December 2014. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A: Holding-Period Returns in Quintiles 
Quintile N 1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 
1 (Sell) 101 
-0.0013 
(-0.14) 
-0.0011 
(-0.09) 
-0.0023 
(-0.15) 
0.0016 
(0.09) 
-0.0068 
(-0.39) 
2 91 
-0.0011 
(-0.13) 
-0.0003 
(-0.03) 
0.0155 
(1.05) 
0.0169 
(1.07) 
0.0280 
(1.59) 
3 90 
0.0097 
(1.19) 
0.0279 
(2.46) 
0.0697*** 
(5.10) 
0.0949*** 
(5.55) 
0.0905*** 
(6.08) 
4 95 
0.0217 
(2.60) 
0.0473*** 
(4.19) 
0.0767*** 
(4.54) 
0.0887*** 
(4.69) 
0.1076*** 
(5.00) 
5 (Buy) 101 
0.0198*** 
(3.00) 
0.0416*** 
(3.71) 
0.0597*** 
(4.21) 
0.0724*** 
(4.44) 
0.0837*** 
(4.41) 
Buy – Sell 
Strategy 
101 
0.0211*** 
(3.02) 
0.0427*** 
(3.35) 
0.0620*** 
(3.91) 
0.0708*** 
(3.70) 
0.0905*** 
(4.34) 
       
   
Panel B: Fama French 3-Factor Alpha 
Quintile N 1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 
1 (Sell) 134 
-0.0152* 
(-1.96) 
-0.0203** 
(-1.98) 
-0.0433*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.0373** 
(-2.20) 
-0.0430** 
(-2.56) 
2 155 
-0.0136** 
(-2.15) 
-0.001 
(-0.1) 
0.0165 
(1.18) 
0.0106 
(0.75) 
0.0231 
(1.46) 
3 157 
0.0025 
(0.46) 
0.0165* 
(1.68) 
0.0473*** 
(3.64) 
0.0744*** 
(4.43) 
0.0793*** 
(4.83) 
4 171 
0.0091 
(1.47) 
0.0263*** 
(3.05) 
0.0501*** 
(4.06) 
0.0666*** 
(4.51) 
0.0909*** 
(5.12) 
5 (Buy) 131 
0.0137** 
(0.0287) 
0.0202** 
(2.04) 
0.0395*** 
(2.90) 
0.0531*** 
(2.88) 
0.0560*** 
(2.82) 
Buy – Sell 
Strategy 
102 
0.022*** 
(3.09) 
0.0304** 
(2.53) 
0.0582*** 
(3.46) 
0.0637*** 
(3.98) 
0.0860*** 
(3.93) 
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6 70 
0.0086 
(0.99) 
0.0215* 
(1.72) 
0.0540*** 
(3.36) 
0.0766*** 
(3.82) 
0.0844*** 
(4.39) 
7 69 
0.0159 
(1.55) 
0.0260** 
(2.37) 
0.0765*** 
(3.50) 
0.0749*** 
(3.79) 
0.0712*** 
(3.28) 
8 66 
0.0326*** 
(3.30) 
0.0531*** 
(4.97) 
0.0817*** 
(4.82) 
0.0988*** 
(4.67) 
0.1251*** 
(4.44) 
9 67 
0.0175 
(1.66) 
0.0305*** 
(2.67) 
0.0555*** 
(2.69) 
0.0769*** 
(3.28) 
0.0970*** 
(3.15) 
10 (Buy) 77 
0.0307*** 
(3.59) 
0.0430*** 
(3.11) 
0.0640*** 
(3.76) 
0.0666*** 
(3.56) 
0.0684*** 
(3.44) 
Buy – Sell 
Strategy 
77 
0.0291*** 
(3.25) 
0.0652*** 
(4.50) 
0.0892*** 
(4.90) 
0.0967*** 
(4.22) 
0.1147*** 
(4.72) 
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Table 3: Monthly Returns to the Recency Strategy 
This table reports the average monthly returns and corresponding Fama-French three-factor alphas in RR quintile 
portfolios respectively. RRH (RRL) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if stocks are ranked in the top (bottom) quintile of 
BH‘s RR, and 0 otherwise. For full description of the variable, please refer to Appendix A. The sample consists of 
stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ for the period January 1995 to December 2014. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A: Monthly Returns of RR Portfolios. 
Quintiles N RR Fama-French alpha 
P1 (RRL) 252 
0.0008*** 
(3.27) 
-0.0161 
(-1.44) 
P2 252 
0.0014*** 
(4.78) 
0.0082 
(0.73) 
P3 252 
0.0018*** 
(6.00) 
0.0247** 
(2.22) 
P4 252 
0.00173*** 
(6.15) 
0.0398*** 
(4.56) 
P5 (RRH) 252 
0.00249*** 
(9.17) 
0.0356*** 
(3.48) 
RRH - RRL 
Strategy 
252 
0.00164*** 
(14.33) 
0.0427*** 
(3.35) 
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Figure 2 Average Analysts’ Performance (Absolute Forecast Error) 
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Table 4: Two-Way Portfolio Level Analysis (Analysts’ Performance) 
This table reports the average absolute analysts‘ performance (forecast error) in the two-way portfolio-level 
analysis. Buy (Sell) revision is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the change in forecast is ranked in the top (bottom) 
portfolio at month t, and 0 otherwise. RRH (RRL) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if stocks are ranked in the top 
(bottom) quintile of BH‘s RR, and 0 otherwise. For full description of the variables, please refer to Appendix A. 
The sample consists of stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ for the period January 1995 to December 
2014. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Boldface represents our key variables of interest. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A: Average Forecast Dispersion 
 
Recency Portfolio 
Forecast Revision Portfolio 
Rev 1 (Sell) Rev2 Rev3 Rev4 Rev 5 (Buy) 
P1 (RRL) 
0.0131*** 
(4.56) 
0.0027*** 
(5.35) 
0.0029*** 
(4.09) 
0.0035*** 
(5.69) 
0.0086*** 
(3.81) 
P2 
0.0075*** 
(5.63) 
0.0038*** 
(3.05) 
0.0032*** 
(3.52) 
0.0030*** 
(4.69) 
0.0040*** 
(5.80) 
P3 
0.0107*** 
(4.82) 
0.0038*** 
(5.90) 
0.0018*** 
(3.85) 
0.0019*** 
(6.20) 
0.0072*** 
(4.52) 
P4 
0.0094*** 
(4.28) 
0.0059*** 
(4.40) 
0.0015*** 
(5.89) 
0.0036*** 
(4.62) 
0.0070*** 
(5.07) 
P5 (RRH) 
0.0072*** 
(4.84) 
0.0048*** 
(4.43) 
0.0020*** 
(5.41) 
0.0031*** 
(7.69) 
0.0066*** 
(5.20) 
      
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
47 
 
Panel B: 2-months Raw Returns 
 
Recency 
Portfolio 
Forecast Revision Portfolio 
Rev 1 (Sell) Rev2 Rev3 Rev4 Rev 5 (Buy) 
P1 (RRL) 
-0.0097 
(-0.39) 
-0.0221 
(-1.34) 
-0.0461*** 
(-2.76) 
0.0163 
(0.63) 
0.0033 
(0.14) 
P2 
-0.0411* 
(-1.88) 
0.0119 
(0.53) 
-0.0155 
(-0.74) 
-0.0033 
(-0.21) 
0.0136 
(0.71) 
P3 
-0.0253 
(-1.49) 
-0.0161 
(-0.82) 
0.0022 
(0.10) 
-0.0076 
(-0.47) 
-0.0027 
(-0.19) 
P4 
0.0082 
(0.36) 
0.0214 
(0.60) 
0.0284 
(1.56) 
0.0230 
(1.34) 
0.0019 
(0.07) 
P5 (RRH) 
0.0786** 
(2.52) 
0.0749*** 
(2.81) 
0.0917*** 
(2.85) 
0.1188*** 
(8.81) 
0.1304*** 
(3.48) 
      
2-months Fama French 3-Factors alpha 
Portfolio (Buy/RRH) 
0.1119** 
(2.35) 
Portfolio (Sell/RRL) 
-0.0390 
(-1.30) 
 
Panel C: 3-months holding-period returns 
 Forecast Revision Portfolio 
 
Table 5: Two-Way Portfolio Level Analysis (Returns) 
This table reports the average monthly portfolio returns in the two-way portfolio-level analysis. Panels 
A, B, and C present month t+1, t+2 and t+3 holding-period returns respectively. The corresponding 
Fama-French three-factor alphas of the winner and loser portfolios (Buy/RRH and Sell/RRH) are reported 
as well. Buy (Sell) revision is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the change in forecast is ranked in the top 
(bottom) portfolio at month t, and 0 otherwise. RRH (RRL) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if stocks 
are ranked in the top (bottom) quintile of BH‘s RR, and 0 otherwise. For full description of the variables, 
please refer to Appendix A. The sample consists of stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ for 
the period January 1995 to December 2014. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Boldface represents our key variables of interest. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels. 
Panel A: 1-month holding-period returns 
 
Recency 
Portfolio 
Forecast Revision Portfolio 
Rev 1 (Sell) Rev2 Rev3 Rev4 Rev 5 (Buy) 
P1 (RRL) 
0.0388** 
(1.93) 
-0.0082 
(-0.74) 
-0.0288*** 
(-2.54) 
0.0053 
(0.27) 
0.0055 
(0.28) 
P2 
-0.0096 
(-0.61) 
-0.0013 
(-0.08) 
-0.0226* 
(-1.95) 
-0.0118 
(-1.04) 
0.0112 
(0.76) 
P3 
-0.0023 
(-0.14) 
-0.0084 
(-0.60) 
-0.0163 
(-1.02) 
-0.0269** 
(-2.25) 
0.0095 
(0.67) 
P4 
0.0148 
(0.84) 
-0.0137 
(-0.66) 
-0.0082 
(-0.60) 
0.0043 
(0.38) 
0.0071 
(0.42) 
P5 (RRH) 
0.0562** 
(2.55) 
0.0234 
(1.06) 
0.0343* 
(1.74) 
0.0688*** 
(6.32) 
0.1011*** 
(2.69) 
      
1-month Fama French 3-Factors alpha 
Portfolio (Buy/RRH) 
0.1214** 
(2.61) 
Portfolio (Sell/RRL) 
0.02437 
(0.49) 
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Recency 
Portfolio 
Rev 1 (Sell) Rev2 Rev3 Rev4 Rev 5 (Buy) 
P1 (RRL) 
-0.0770** 
(-2.34) 
-0.0181 
(-0.83) 
-0.0532** 
(-2.40) 
0.0129 
(0.42) 
-0.0358 
(-1.03) 
P2 
-0.0306 
(-0.77) 
0.0225 
(0.79) 
-0.0361 
(-1.57) 
0.0036 
(0.16) 
0.0068 
(0.23) 
P3 
-0.0224 
(-0.86) 
-0.0391* 
(-1.81) 
0.0220 
(0.83) 
0.0213 
(0.72) 
-0.0020 
(-0.09) 
P4 
0.0277 
(0.81) 
0.0497 
(1.41) 
0.0836*** 
(3.08) 
0.0461** 
(2.15) 
0.0837** 
(2.04) 
P5 (RRH) 
0.1477*** 
(2.94) 
0.1054*** 
(2.88) 
0.1905*** 
(3.38) 
0.1730*** 
(7.56) 
0.1746*** 
(4.26) 
      
3-months Fama French 3-Factors alpha 
Portfolio (Buy/RRH) 
0.1986*** 
(7.37) 
Portfolio (Sell/RRL) 
-0.0697*** 
(-4.40) 
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Table 6: Two-Way Portfolio Level Analysis with Positive Performance (Returns) 
This table reports the average monthly portfolio returns in the two-way portfolio-level analysis with the inclusion 
of positive performance (Perf). Panels A, B, and C present month t+1, t+2 and t+3 holding-period returns 
respectively. The corresponding Fama-French three-factor alphas of the winner and loser portfolios (Buy/RRH and 
Sell/RRH) are reported as well. Buy (Sell) revision is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the change in forecast is 
ranked in the top (bottom) portfolio at month t, and 0 otherwise. RRH (RRL) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
stocks are ranked in the top (bottom) quintile of BH‘s RR, and 0 otherwise. Positive performance (Perf) is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if UpdatedError is less than ExpectedError. For full description of the variables, 
please refer to Appendix A. The sample consists of stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ for the period 
January 1995 to December 2014. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Boldface represents 
our key variables of interest. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A: 1-month Raw Returns 
 
Recency 
Portfolio 
Forecast Revision Portfolio with Positive Performance 
Rev 1 (Sell) Rev2 Rev3 Rev4 Rev 5 (Buy) 
P1 (RRL) 
0.0448** 
(2.09) 
0.0088 
(0.61) 
-0.0169 
(-1.24) 
0.0021 
(0.10) 
0.0275 
(0.73) 
P2 
-0.0260 
(-1.33) 
-0.0179 
(-0.72) 
-0.0278** 
(-2.16) 
-0.0106 
(-0.71) 
0.0043 
(0.30) 
P3 
-0.0133 
(-0.75) 
-0.0163 
(-0.73) 
-0.0409** 
(-2.09) 
-0.0240** 
(-2.00) 
0.0189 
(0.97) 
P4 
0.0308 
(1.06) 
0.0194 
(0.73) 
0.0069 
(0.47) 
0.0036 
(0.22) 
0.0242 
(1.30) 
P5 (RRH) 
0.0560*** 
(3.10) 
0.0095 
(0.39) 
0.0438** 
(2.09) 
0.0504*** 
(4.49) 
0.1275** 
(2.07) 
      
1-month Fama-French 3-Factors alpha 
Portfolio (RRH, Buy) 
0.1193 
(1.39) 
Portfolio (RRL, Sell) 
0.0268* 
(1.88) 
Panel B: 2-months Raw Returns 
 
Recency 
Portfolio 
Forecast Revision Portfolio with Positive Performance 
Rev 1 (Sell) Rev2 Rev3 Rev4 Rev 5 (Buy) 
P1 (RRL) 
0.0014 
(0.05) 
-0.0001 
(-0.10) 
-0.0291 
(-1.32) 
0.0270 
(0.73) 
0.0259 
(0.65) 
P2 
-0.0466 
(-1.67) 
-0.0028 
(-0.09) 
-0.0119 
(-0.43) 
0.0037 
(0.17) 
-0.0188 
(-1.34) 
P3 
-0.0158 
(-0.76) 
-0.0279 
(-0.89) 
-0.0298 
(-1.15) 
0.0081 
(0.40) 
0.0129 
(0.68) 
P4 
0.0208 
(0.61) 
0.0663 
(1.63) 
0.0255 
(1.15) 
0.0243 
(1.09) 
0.0444 
(1.13) 
P5 (RRH) 
0.0913*** 
(2.93) 
0.0396 
(1.11) 
0.0816*** 
(2.83) 
0.0970*** 
(5.21) 
0.1390** 
(2.27) 
      
2-months Fama-French 3-Factors alpha 
Portfolio (RRH, Buy) 
0.1195 
(1.40) 
Portfolio (RRL, Sell) 
-0.0041 
(-0.13) 
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Panel C: 3-months Raw Returns 
 
Recency 
Portfolio 
Forecast Revision Portfolio with Positive Performance 
Rev 1 (Sell) Rev2 Rev3 Rev4 Rev 5 (Buy) 
P1 (RRL) 
-0.0794*** 
(-2.69) 
0.0227 
(1.02) 
-0.0398 
(-1.42) 
0.0103 
(0.24) 
-0.0145 
(-0.21) 
P2 
-0.0568 
(-1.30) 
0.0190 
(0.44) 
-0.0321 
(-1.42) 
0.0294 
(0.85) 
-0.0185 
(-0.79) 
P3 
-0.0206 
(-0.53) 
-0.0518 
(-1.51) 
0.0229 
(0.64) 
0.0611 
(1.46) 
-0.0011 
(-0.04) 
P4 
0.0478 
(1.16) 
0.0728 
(1.92) 
0.0749** 
(2.40) 
0.0457 
(1.51) 
0.1368** 
(2.22) 
P5 (RRH) 
0.1670*** 
(3.05) 
0.0569 
(1.42) 
0.1922*** 
(2.74) 
0.1221*** 
(3.85) 
0.2109*** 
(3.73) 
      
3-months Fama French 3-Factors Alpha 
Portfolio (RRH, Buy) 
0.1653*** 
(3.12) 
Portfolio (RRL, Sell) 
-0.0901*** 
(-3.02) 
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Table 7: Panel Regression with Stocks in the Recency Strategy 
                                                                                            
                                                                                          
This table reports the regression results for month t+1, t+2, and t+3 stock returns as the dependent variable 
when we limit our sample to stocks in the recency strategy (RRH and RRL). Columns (1), (3) and (5) report 
results of forecast revision portfolios without positive performance, and Columns (2), (4), and (6) report results 
of forecast revision portfolios with positive performance. The full regression model is: 
 
 
Subscripts j, t, and p represent stock j, time t and p = month t+1 to t+3. For full description of the variables, 
please refer to Appendix A. The sample is stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ for the period January 
1995 to December 2014. The corresponding t-statistics are in parentheses. Boldface represents our key variables 
of interest. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Predic
ted 
Sign 
Stock Returns  
at T+1 month 
Stock Returns  
at T+ 2 months 
Stock Returns  
at T+ 3 months 
Variables 
(1)  
News 
 
 
(2)  
With 
Positive 
Performance 
(3)  
News 
 
 
(4)  
With 
Positive 
Performance 
(5)  
News 
 
 
(6)  
With Positive 
Performance 
 
Buy  + 
0.0182** 
(2.12) 
 
-0.0057 
(-0.60) 
 
 
-0.0091 
(-0.87) 
 
Sell  - 
-0.0007 
(-0.07) 
 
-0.0095 
(-0.72) 
 
 
-0.0336* 
(-1.92) 
 
Buy*Perf +  
0.0270** 
(2.10) 
 
 
-0.0167 
(-0.93) 
 
 
0.0091 
(0.74) 
Sell *Perf -  
0.0032 
(0.19) 
 
 
-0.0085 
(-0.49) 
 
 
-0.0374** 
(-2.53) 
Perf +/-  
-0.0055 
(-0.61) 
 
 
-0.0004 
(-0.04) 
 
 
-0.0018 
(-0.17) 
WHH + 
0.0420*** 
(4.19) 
0.0414*** 
(4.26) 
0.0409*** 
(3.91) 
0.0406*** 
(3.80) 
0.0352*** 
(4.52) 
0.0335*** 
(4.37) 
WHL - 
-
0.0565*** 
(-3.77) 
-0.0580*** 
(-3.89) 
-0.0209 
(-1.37) 
-0.0217 
(-1.40) 
-0.0612*** 
(-3.34) 
-0.0620*** 
(-3.35) 
Size t-1mth +/- 
-
0.0293*** 
(-3.61) 
-0.0294*** 
(-3.75) 
-0.0219** 
(-2.44) 
-0.0218** 
(-2.48) 
-0.0222*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.0205*** 
(-2.88) 
BM t-1year +/- 
-0.0430 
(-1.46) 
-0.0463 
(-1.51) 
-0.0283 
(-1.35) 
-0.0267 
(-1.28) 
0.0114 
(0.59) 
0.0106 
(0.54) 
Volatility 
t-1yr 
+/- 
1.6913** 
(2.10) 
1.6791** 
(2.03) 
0.0257 
(0.03) 
0.0133 
(0.02) 
1.3818* 
(1.75) 
1.3915 
(1.67) 
Firm Age +/- 
0.0008 
(0.60) 
0.0008 
(0.60) 
0.0012 
(0.96) 
0.0011 
(0.85) 
-0.0006 
(-0.56) 
-0.0007 
(-0.63) 
Cons +/- 
0.2101*** 
(2.87) 
0.2200*** 
(3.15) 
0.1664** 
(2.38) 
0.1657** 
(2.46) 
0.1295* 
(1.99) 
0.1092* 
(1.81) 
N  578 578 577 577 592 592 
Adj. R2  0.169 0.165 0.068 0.068 0.129 0.128 
F  26.6346 24.0461 9.3275 14.0439 24.66 23.32 
Fixed 
Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 8: Year by Year Buy-Sell Forecast Revision Strategy 
This table presents the year-by-year analysis of average monthly returns to the Buy-Sell revision strategy up to three-months ahead. Buy (Sell) revision is a dummy variable 
equals to 1 if the change in forecast is ranked in the top (bottom) portfolio at month t, and 0 otherwise. The Buy-Sell strategy represents a trading strategy that simultaneously 
buys stocks in Buy revision and short-selling stocks in the Sell revision portfolio. For full description of the variable, please refer to Appendix A. The sample consists of stocks 
listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ for the period January 1995 to December 2014. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  Boldface represents our key 
variables of interest. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
  
Stock Returns t  Stock Returns t+1  Stock Returns t+2  Stock Returns t+3 
 
Year Obs 
Buy  
Mean 
Sell 
 Mean 
Diff 
(Buy – 
Sell) 
Buy 
Mean 
Sell 
Mean 
Diff  
(Buy – 
Sell) 
Buy 
Mean 
Sell 
Mean 
Diff 
(Buy – 
Sell) 
Buy 
Mean 
Sell 
Mean 
Diff 
(Buy – 
Sell) 
1995 4 
0.0273 
(1.53) 
-0.0170 
(-0.38) 
0.0442 
(1.18) 
0.0768 
(2.00) 
-0.0325 
(-1.55) 
0.1094** 
(4.40) 
0.0472* 
(2.74) 
-0.0254 
(-2.31) 
0.0726** 
(5.49) 
0.0571 
(2.28) 
-0.0111 
(-0.54) 
0.0682* 
(2.52) 
1996 4 
0.0639 
(0.76) 
-0.0155 
(-0.60) 
0.0794 
(1.27) 
0.0110 
(0.23) 
-0.0117 
(-0.23) 
0.0227 
(0.54) 
0.0738 
(1.23) 
-0.0411 
(-0.80) 
0.1148 
(2.29) 
0.1018 
(1.28) 
-0.0511 
(-0.91) 
0.1530 
(2.23) 
1997 5 
0.0367 
(0.64) 
0.0046 
(0.16) 
0.0367 
(0.50) 
0.0445 
(1.43) 
0.0482 
(0.96) 
-0.0037 
(-0.14) 
0.1459 
(1.38) 
-0.0232 
(-0.64) 
0.1691 
(1.43) 
0.1450 
(1.46) 
-0.0269 
(-0.41) 
0.1718 
(1.24) 
1998 3 
0.0753 
(0.71) 
-0.0305 
(-0.63) 
0.1059 
(1.34) 
0.0703 
(0.93) 
-0.0242 
(-0.39) 
0.0945 
(1.90) 
0.0661 
(1.79) 
0.0442 
(0.61) 
0.0219 
(0.54) 
0.0531 
(1.02) 
0.0372 
(0.39) 
0.0159 
(0.28) 
1999 7 
0.0458 
(0.47) 
-0.1043* 
(-2.20) 
0.1501 
(1.76) 
-0.0400 
(-1.00) 
-0.0166 
(-0.56) 
-0.0234 
(-0.37) 
-0.0218 
(-0.82) 
-0.0735 
(-1.49) 
0.0517 
(1.14) 
-0.0586 
(-1.07) 
-0.1014 
(-1.45) 
0.0428 
(0.54) 
2000 5 
0.0319 
(0.43) 
0.0889 
(1.40) 
-0.0570 
(-0.67) 
0.0920 
(1.21) 
0.0417 
(1.09) 
0.0502 
(1.09) 
0.0891 
(1.98) 
-0.0166 
(-0.87) 
0.1057 
(1.74) 
0.1479** 
(3.28) 
0.0253 
(0.63) 
0.1225 
(1.94) 
2001 6 
0.0082 
(0.49) 
0.1001 
(1.32) 
-0.0919 
(-1.21) 
-0.0266 
(-0.60) 
-0.0447 
(-0.61) 
0.0182 
(0.28) 
0.0309 
(0.58) 
0.0432 
(0.47) 
-0.0123 
(-0.15) 
0.0813 
(1.18) 
-0.0221 
(-0.27) 
0.1033 
(1.30) 
2002 5 
-0.0697 
(-1.47) 
0.0053 
(0.05) 
-0.0749 
(-0.83) 
-0.0118 
(-0.42) 
-0.0011 
(-0.01) 
-0.0106 
(-0.17) 
-0.0169 
(-0.26) 
-0.1268 
(-1.17) 
0.1099 
(1.57) 
-0.0077 
(-0.09) 
-0.1640 
(-1.67) 
0.1563** 
(2.84) 
2003 6 
0.0331 
(1.39) 
-0.0144 
(-0.41) 
0.0476* 
(2.29) 
0.0212 
(1.46) 
0.0102 
(0.60) 
0.0110 
(0.57) 
0.0119 
(0.42) 
0.0137 
(0.32) 
-0.0018 
(-0.042) 
0.0824 
(1.40) 
0.0647 
(0.99) 
0.0177 
(0.25) 
2004 6 
0.0635 
(1.64) 
0.0033 
(0.09) 
0.0603 
(1.28) 
0.0363 
(1.68) 
0.0024 
(0.12) 
0.0339** 
(5.17) 
0.0452 
(1.14) 
0.0552* 
(2.57) 
-0.0100 
(-0.24) 
0.0657 
(1.09) 
0.0926 
(1.00) 
-0.0270 
(-0.24) 
2005 6 
0.0706** 
(2.65) 
-0.0233 
(-2.00) 
0.0939** 
(4.07) 
0.0101 
(0.58) 
-0.0107 
(-0.34) 
0.0209 
(1.00) 
0.0469* 
(2.13) 
0.0441 
(1.08) 
0.0028 
(0.07) 
0.0296 
(2.00) 
0.0556 
(0.94) 
-0.0259 
(-0.48) 
2006 4 
0.0276* 
(2.32) 
-0.0010 
(-0.03) 
0.0286 
(1.09) 
0.0094 
(1.23) 
-0.0036 
(-0.23) 
0.0130 
(0.61) 
0.0737 
(1.30) 
0.0152 
(0.40) 
0.0585 
(1.54) 
0.1174 
(1.70) 
0.0085 
(0.27) 
0.1088 
(2.09) 
2007 4 
0.0216 
(0.43) 
-0.0321 
(-1.35) 
0.0537 
(1.37) 
0.0505 
(1.56) 
-0.0552 
(-1.23) 
0.1057* 
(2.69) 
0.0492 
(1.56) 
-0.0358 
(-1.23) 
0.0850** 
(4.61) 
0.0734 
(1.57) 
-0.0334 
(-1.08) 
0.1069* 
(2.85) 
2008 5 
-0.0822* 
(-2.45) 
-0.0866*** 
(-4.27) 
0.0044 
(0.13) 
0.0162 
(0.36) 
-0.0151 
(-0.18) 
0.0313 
(0.69) 
0.0014 
(0.07) 
-0.0854** 
(-3.16) 
0.0868*** 
(6.51) 
0.0306 
(0.77) 
-0.1034 
(-1.76) 
0.1340** 
(3.01) 
2009 7 
0.0656* 
(2.00) 
0.0084 
(0.26) 
0.0571 
(1.83) 
0.1144* 
(2.21) 
0.0686 
(1.99) 
0.0458 
(1.21) 
0.0216* 
(0.28) 
0.0704 
(1.07) 
-0.0488 
(-0.74) 
-0.0005 
(-0.01) 
0.0358 
(0.38) 
-0.0363 
(-0.69) 
2010 5 0.0580 0.0152 0.0428* 0.0486 0.0494 -0.0008 0.0252 -0.0128 0.0380 0.0796* 0.0126 0.0669* 
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(1.91) (0.36) (2.47) (1.56) (1.06) (-0.03) (0.76) (-0.39) (1.29) (2.76) (0.33) (2.27) 
2011 4 
-0.0014 
(-0.05) 
-0.0119 
(-0.27) 
0.0105 
(0.45) 
-0.0077 
(-0.29) 
-0.0192 
(-0.42) 
0.0115 
(0.40) 
-0.0120 
(-0.38) 
-0.0393 
(-0.88) 
0.0272 
(1.97) 
0.0397 
(0.54) 
-0.0330 
(-0.32) 
0.0726 
(2.16) 
2012 5 
0.0154 
(0.56) 
-0.0020 
(-0.14) 
0.0174 
(0.55) 
0.0435** 
(3.41) 
0.0124 
(0.36) 
0.0311 
(1.24) 
0.1015 
(1.77) 
0.0287 
(1.25) 
0.0727 
(1.16) 
0.1208 
(1.97) 
0.0472 
(1.67) 
0.0736 
(1.47) 
2013 5 
0.0625** 
(2.97) 
0.0231 
(1.07) 
0.0394 
(1.56) 
0.0576 
(1.59) 
0.0395 
(1.10) 
0.0181 
(0.34) 
0.1104** 
(3.42) 
0.0730** 
(3.82) 
0.0374 
(0.93) 
0.1388** 
(4.34) 
0.0656*
* 
(3.54) 
0.0732* 
(2.50) 
2014 5 
-0.0166 
(-0.90) 
-0.0147 
(-0.59) 
-0.0019 
(-0.12) 
0.0222 
(0.58) 
-0.0296 
(-0.98) 
0.0518 
(1.58) 
-0.0076 
(-0.28) 
0.0323 
(1.46) 
-0.0399 
(-0.92) 
-0.0255 
(-1.25) 
0.0366 
(0.57) 
-0.0620 
(0.87) 
Obs 101           
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APPENDIX A: Description of Key Variables 
6.1 Table A.1: Description of Key Variables 
The table presents the definition of variables used in the regression analysis equations (8), (9) and (10). Panel A presents 
the dependent variable. Panel B presents the momentum and analysts‘ forecast revision variables. Panel C presents the 
control variables that are utilized in this analysis. Panel D describes the variables used in the construction of analysts‘ 
positive performance. 
Variables Description Key Reference 
Panel A: Dependent Variable 
Returns 
Return of stock j in month t. 
 
(Returns are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile) 
Bhootra and Hur 
(2013) 
Panel B: Independent Variable 
Analysts‘ Forecast Buy 
(Sell) Revision Portfolio 
             is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the change in 
monthly mean forecast consensus for stocks j is ranked in the top 
(bottom) 20% portfolio in the end of portfolio formation month t. 
 
The change in monthly mean forecast consensus is measured as the 
difference between mean forecast consensus for month t and the 
previous month, scaled by previous month‘s stock price.  
 
(Forecast with value of ―-999999‖ are removed from sample) 
Chen et al. (2015) 
Analysts‘ Positive 
Performance 
Positive performance (       refers to the average analysts‘ recent 
performance on stock j, and is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
             
 
 (average short-term performance) is less than 
              
 
 (intermediate benchmark performance), and is 0 
otherwise.  
Laksanabunsong 
(2015) 
52-Week-High (Low) 
Portfolio  
52WHH (52WHL) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if stock 
j‘s                        s    
             
                
.is ranked 
in the top (bottom) 20% at the end of month    , and is 0 
otherwise. 
George and Hwang 
(2004) 
Recency Ratio High 
(Low) Portfolio 
RRH (RRL) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if stock j‘s 
                            
                                        
   
 is 
ranked in the top (bottom) 20% at the end of month      and is 0 
otherwise. 
Bhootra and Hur 
(2013) 
Panel C: Other Control Variables 
Prior month Returns 
Return to stock j at the end of the previous month. 
 
(Prior month‘s returns are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile) 
Bhootra and Hur 
(2013) 
Firm Size 
The natural logarithm of stock j‘s market capitalization (Adjusted 
Price x Shares Outstanding in millions) at the end of previous 
month.  
Fama and French 
(1993) 
Book-to-Market Ratio 
Book value of shareholders‘ equity plus deferred taxes divided by 
its market value at the end of the last fiscal year. 
 
(Negative book-to-market values are removed from sample) 
Burghof and 
Prothmann (2011) 
Volatility Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the past year 
Burghof and 
Prothmann (2011) 
Firm Age The number of months since Compustat began covering the firm Burghof and 
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Prothmann (2011) 
Panel D: Construction of Analysts‘ Positive Performance 
Analyst Performance 
(Forecast Error) 
Analyst performance is the difference between the average earnings 
forecasts (at month t) and actual realized earnings (at quarter t) on 
stock j, scaled by prior year‘s stock price and set of firms that 
analyst i covers. 
(Actual realized earnings of ―-999999‖ are removed from sample) 
Laksanabunsong 
(2015) 
              
 
 
Expected Error is the average analyst performance on stock j at 
month t over the past year (12 months), and it represents the 
intermediate-term or benchmark performance of the average 
analyst of the stock. 
Laksanabunsong 
(2015) 
             
 
 
Updated Error is the average analyst performance scaled by the 
number of analysts on stock j at month t, and it represents the short-
term or updated performance of the average analyst of the stock. 
Laksanabunsong 
(2015) 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
56 
 
APPENDIX B: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix of Key Information Variables 
 
Table B.1: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the Pearson correlation matrix of the key variables in the original sample. In each month t, stocks are in quintile-based portfolios based on the past 6-months 
GH‘s proximity to 52-week-high (WH) ratio, BH‘s recency ratio (RR), and the magnitude of forecast revision. WHH (WHL) is a dummy variable that equals 1  if stocks are in 
the top (bottom)‘s portfolios, and 0 otherwise. RRH (RRL) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if stocks are ranked in the top (bottom)‘s quintile, and 0 otherwise. Buy (Sell) 
revision is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the change in forecast is ranked in the top (bottom) quintile portfolios at month t, and 0 otherwise. The change in forecast is the 
change in mean earnings forecast between month t and the previous month, scaled by previous month‘s stock price. Analysts‘ Performance measures the recent forecasting 
performance of analysts and is computed as the average forecast error of analyst i, scaled by beginning year stock price and the set of firms analyst i covers. Returns t-1month is 
the prior month‘s returns. Sizet-1month is the log of market capitalization (in millions) of stock j at the end of previous month. Book to Markett-1 year is the book-to-market ratio. 
Volatilityt-1year is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the past year. Firm Age is the firm‘s age. For full description of the variables, please refer to Appendix 
A. The sample consists of stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ for the period January 1995 to December 2014. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels. 
 Returns WHH WHL RRH RRL Buy Sell Perf BMt-1 year Sizet-1year Rett-1mth Volt-1year FirmAge 
Returns 1.00             
WHH 0.063 1.00            
WHL -0.004 -0.240
***
 1.00           
RRH 0.031 0.540
***
 -0.144
**
 1.00          
RRL -0.010 -0.226
***
 0.156
**
 -0.253
***
 1.00         
Buy 0.062 0.003 -0.010 0.014 0.027 1.00        
Sell -0.071 -0.096 0.140
**
 0.013 0.055 -0.270
***
 1.00       
Perf -0.014 -0.042 0.073 -0.013 0.083 0.047 -0.010 1.00      
BMt-1year -0.021 -0.096 0.050 -0.061 0.140
**
 0.169
***
 0.120
*
 0.063 1.00     
Size t-1year -0.047 0.124
*
 -0.138
**
 0.044 -0.039 0.015 -0.086 0.034 -0.162
**
 1.00    
Returnst-1month -0.114
*
 0.248
***
 -0.230
***
 0.274
***
 -0.083 0.032 0.071 -0.126
*
 -0.034 -0.121
*
 1.00   
Volt-1year 0.034 -0.115
*
 0.349
***
 -0.035 -0.007 -0.020 0.049 -0.027 -0.179
***
 -0.255
***
 0.048 1.00  
Firm Age -0.043 0.070 -0.079 0.034 -0.149
**
 0.066 0.044 -0.021 -0.019 0.149
**
 0.003 -0.264
***
 1.00 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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APPENDIX C: GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF 
TWO-WAY PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS 
Figure C.1: Two-way Portfolio Level Analysis 
This figure graphically represents Table 5 and it depicts the two-way portfolio analysis between analysts‘ 
forecast revisions and recency portfolios. Panel A, B, and C, presents month t+1, t+2, and t+3 ahead holding-
period returns respectively. The vertical-axis represents the corresponding holding-period returns and 
horizontal-axis represents stocks in the recency portfolio (P1 to P5). The blocks with various colour coding 
represent stocks in the analysts‘ forecast revision portfolios (Rev1 to Rev5). Stocks are independently sorted in 
quintile-portfolios according to their respective criterions. RRH (RRL) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
stocks are ranked in the top (bottom) quintile-portfolios based on BH‘s RR at month t-1, and 0 otherwise. Buy 
(Sell) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the change in forecast is ranked in the top (bottom) quintile-portfolios 
at month t, and 0 otherwise. For full description of the variables, please refer to Appendix A. The sample 
consists of stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ for the period January 1995 to December 2014. 
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Figure C.2: Two-way Portfolio Level Analysis with Positive Performance 
This figure graphically represents Table 6 and it depicts the two-way portfolio analysis between analysts‘ 
forecast revisions with positive performance and recency portfolios. Panel A, B, and C, presents month t+1, 
month t+2, and month t+3 ahead holding-period returns respectively. The vertical-axis represents the 
corresponding holding-period returns and horizontal-axis represents stocks in the recency portfolio (P1 to P5). 
The blocks with various colour coding represent stocks in the analysts‘ forecast revision portfolios with positive 
performance (Rev1 to Rev5). Stocks are independently sorted in quintile-portfolios according to their respective 
criterions. RRH (RRL) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if stocks are ranked in the top (bottom) quintile-
portfolios based on BH‘s RR at month t-1, and 0 otherwise. Buy (Sell) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
change in forecast is ranked in the top (bottom) quintile-portfolios at month t, and 0 otherwise. Positive 
Performance (Perf) represents stocks that are covered by better performing analysts, and equals to 1 if their 
UpdatedError is less than ExpectedError, and 0 otherwise. For full description of the variables, please refer to 
Appendix A. The sample consists of stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ for the period January 1995 
to December 2014. 
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Highlights 
 Analysts provide value-relevant signals after accounting for momentum 
indicators. 
 Analysts are information intermediaries in the price-continuation momentum 
effect. 
 There is pervasive asymmetric reaction to good and bad news.  
 Larger (Smaller) post-forecast revision drift in Sell (Buy) revision portfolios. 
 Findings consistent with incentive-driven reporting and optimistic biases. 
